The unchanged reality of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict

Because of the war in Ukraine, the escalation of the situation in the South Caucasus was somewhat forgotten in the press. However, it would be fatal to lose sight of this potential trouble spot, because those in power in the region could be tempted to profit from the current situation and push through their own agenda in the slipstream of the Ukraine war. However, it is the ostracised underdogs of world politics who must solve this conflict.

In the current extremely tensed international situation, in which both the security of supply and the political and economic stability of Europe are threatened, the confrontation between Azerbaijan and Armenia is of great importance. The South Caucasus region represents an important section in the transport route of Caspian energy sources to Europe and has gained in importance as a result of the interruption of gas supplies from Russia. In this context, the Memorandum of Understanding on Strategic Energy Partnership signed between the European Union and Azerbaijan on 18 July 2022 may be considered a key event in ensuring Europe’s energy security: Azerbaijan and the EU agreed to double the amount of natural gas supplied from Azerbaijan to 20 billion cubic metres per year in the coming years. Some of the gas will probably come from Turkmenistan. Europe is apparently very good at dealing with autocrats when it comes to low-cost raw materials. However, Baku also benefits from the current high prices for natural gas and oil and is unlikely to offer the EU any “reduced prices for friends”.

Escalation since May 2021

As early as May 2021, Azerbaijani soldiers had advanced several kilometres into Armenia in the provinces of Syunik and Gegharkunik. At the time, the European Parliament as well as the United States and France – two of the three co-chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group – called on Azerbaijan to withdraw its troops from internationally recognised Armenian territory. In July and November 2021, there were further clashes, which must be considered the most serious violation of the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh ceasefire agreement¹ to date.
  On the evening of 12 September this year, the Armenian Defence Ministry reported that the Azerbaijani army was shelling the localities of Goris, Artanish, Sotk, Jermuk, Kapan and Ishkhanasar with artillery and heavy weapons and had made local advances. For its part, the Azerbaijani Defence Ministry accused Armenia of committing “large-scale provocations” in the Dashkasan, Kalbajar and Lachin regions and of laying mines along the Azerbaijani army’s supply routes.² A ceasefire brokered by Russia on 13 September was apparently broken only minutes after it came into force.³
  On 14 September, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan declared that Azerbaijan had taken control of certain areas on Armenian territory, whereupon Armenia invoked Article 4 of the Collective Security Treaty for the first time in Armenian history. Armenia is a member of the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO), whose members have pledged to stand by each other in the event of military aggression.⁴ Apparently, Baku came to realise that the CSTO is capable of acting, even though Russia is currently tied up in the war in Ukraine, because on 16 September, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev told his Russian counterpart Putin that the situation was stable.⁵ According to an Armenian MP, Armenia has since regained control of six previously lost positions on the border.⁶ Parts of Armenian territory, however, are and remain occupied by Azerbaijani troops.

Unalterable negotiating positions

Despite the positive dynamics in the process of normalisation of Armenian-Azerbaijani relations over the past year, the recent escalation did not come as a surprise: Azerbaijan and Armenia continue to hold diametrically opposed positions on a number of key issues. In particular, Baku’s demand for the opening of the Zangezur corridor through southern Armenia between the Azerbaijani heartland and the Autonomous Republic of Nakhichevan proved to be a bone of contention. Without an early opening of the Zangezur corridor, it will be difficult to speak of peace, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev had already declared in June 2022 at the Global Baku Forum in Baku.⁷ In this context, territorial demands on Armenia are already in the air.⁸
  Even after the 44-day war in autumn 2020, issues such as the status of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, which calls itself Artsakh, and Armenia’s military support for Artsakh remain unresolved.

Attempts by the West to mediate

At present, the ceasefire on the Armenian-Azerbaijani border is crumbling. Baku believes it can act from a position of strength and apparently rejects a mediation mission by the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe OSCE. The fact that Armenian soldiers are still being held in Azerbaijan for alleged war crimes contributes to mutual mistrust, as do unresolved issues of preserving religious, historical and cultural monuments in Nagorno-Karabakh, which are now on Azerbaijani-controlled territory.⁹ Since November 2020, Russian soldiers have been protecting the Dadivank monastery in the Terter Valley, which is said to have been founded by a disciple of the apostle Jude Thaddeus in the first century AD.¹⁰
  The Azerbaijani government is possibly hoping for an overthrow of the Pashinyan government and is consequently not prepared to make any concessions. On the other hand, in this atmosphere, any concession by Yerevan will be interpreted as a caving in by the Pashinyan government. Baku, however, is sure of Turkey’s support and may go all out after Turkey’s top politician and Erdogan ally Mustafa Destici threatened on 15 September to wipe Armenia and the Armenian people off the face of the earth:
  “We say to the Armenian government: come to your senses: I remind you once again that the Turkish nation is capable of erasing Armenia from history and geography, and that it is at the limit of its patience.”¹¹
  The political leadership in Baku may have interpreted the conclusion of the supply contract with the EU as a secret acquiescence in a hard line towards Yerevan.¹² Conversely, this conclusion of the contract may have created certain doubts in Yerevan about Brussels’ impartiality. Armenian intellectuals already suspect that the so-called Western community of values wants to sacrifice Armenia on the altar of its energy interests.¹³ This makes the declarations of solidarity by top Western politicians to the Armenian people seem somewhat weak, as does Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Yerevan.¹⁴ From the Armenian point of view, this may have been done primarily out of consideration for the influential Armenian diaspora in the USA. From a Russian perspective, Pelosi may have been pursuing geopolitical goals.

Weak West

But the keys to resolving the conflict no longer lie in Brussels, Washington or Paris anyway. The West, with its anti-Russian policy, has become too constrained and too dependent on Azerbaijan to act independently.
  Without security guarantees for its territorial integrity and the safety of its people, Armenia will not allow a transit corridor through the south of the country, which Azerbaijani military transports may be able to use. For this alone, the Pashinyan government will have to do a lot of convincing in its own country, because the fear in Armenia is great and the front of the hardliners is strong. As things stand, a security guarantee for Armenia can only come from the OVKS member countries. Whether the OVKS member countries are in a position to do so is not clear at present. Such guarantees would then have to be accompanied by measures on the transparency of military activities in the South Caucasus region.
  However, in order for a negotiated solution to become possible at all, Ankara must put the brakes on all those who are currently striving for a military solution. Azerbaijan and Turkey are both interested in further transit corridors to Central Asia. Here, too, the Central Asian countries could be helpful. And Iran’s attitude will also be important, because it will not allow any activities on its northern border that could pose a threat to it. In all of this, it is important to avoid interference by Israel, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and others, because that would complicate the situation immeasurably. The underdogs of world politics must now ensure that the South Caucasus does not become the extended battleground of the Middle East.  •

¹ see Eurasianet, 17 November 2021: “As Azerbaijan pushes advantage against Armenia, Russia’s role again under scrutiny», online under https://eurasianet.org/as-azerbaijan-pushes-advantage-against-armenia-russias-role-again-under-scrutiny; Kucera, Joshua. Armenia and Azerbaijan in new border crisis, cf. Eurasianet, 14 May 2021; European Parliament resolution on prisoners of war in the aftermath of the most recent conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan (2021/2693(RSP)), European Parliament. 19 May 2021, online: https://web.archive.org/web/20210526023348/https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/RC-9-2021-0277_EN.html; Emanuel Macron: “Azerbaijani armed forces have crossed into Armenian territory. They must withdraw immediately. I say again to the Armenian people: France stands with you in solidarity and will continue to do so”, on Twitter, 12 May 2021, online https://twitter.com/EmmanuelMacron/status/1392965873187659778; Press release of the US-Department of State: Press Briefing – 14 May 2021, online: https://www.state.gov/briefings/department-press-briefing-may-14-2021/. cf. Aze.media, 13 September 2022: Azerbaijan secures control of strategic heights, online: https://aze.media/azerbaijan-secures-control-of-strategic-heights/
² see homepage of the Azerbaijanian Ministry of Defence: https://mod.gov.az/en/news/armenian-armed-forces-committed-large-scale-provocations-in-dashkasan-kalbajar-and-lachin-directions-42330.html. cf. Call to the international community: on the current situation in Armenia at Pressenza, 20 September 2022, online: https://www.pressenza.com/de/2022/09/aufruf-an-die-internationale-gemeinschaft-zur-aktuellen-lage-in-armenien/
³ see Wang, Philip; Kaufman, Ellie; Chernova, Anna; Subramaniam, Tara. “Russia claims ceasefire reached between Armenia and Azerbaijan after fighting erupts along border”, CNN of 13 September 2022, online: https://edition.cnn.com/2022/09/13/middleeast/azerbaijan-armenia-artillery-strikes-intl-hnk/index.html and Reuters of 13 September 2022: “Azerbaijan and Armenia ceasefire fails within minutes – media”, https://www.reuters.com/world/azerbaijan-armenia-ceasefire-fails-within-minutes-media-2022-09-13/. cf. Мария Шустрова: Армения и Азербайджан договорились о перемирии, cf. gazeta.ru, 15.9.2022, online: https://www.gazeta.ru/army/2022/09/15/15454957.shtml
⁴ see AP News of 15 September 2022: “Armenian security official says that Armenia and Azerbaijan have agreed on a cease-fire to end two days of fighting”, online: https://apnews.com/article/ap-news-alert-azerbaijan-armenia-19401191b9f5d7eac2ffa66c819fb292 and Demourian, Avet. “Armenia, Azerbaijan agree on cease-fire to end fighting”, AP News of 15 September 2022, online: https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-azerbaijan-armenia-government-and-politics-bbf809ad3d368fa9c5c497a2d79e22d6
⁵ see Daily Sabah from 16 May 2022. “Azerbaijan-Armenia violence stabilized, Aliyev tells Putin”, online: https://www.dailysabah.com/politics/diplomacy/azerbaijan-armenia-violence-stabilized-aliyev-tells-putin
⁶ see Panorama of 16 September 2022: «Armenian forces recaptured six positons, senior MP says», online: https://www.panorama.am/en/news/2022/09/16/recapture-positons/2730914
⁷ see Homepage of the Azerbaijani Presidential Administration of 16 June 2022. “Ilham Aliyev attended the opening of the IX Global Baku Forum”, online: https://president.az/en/articles/view/56442
⁸ cf. Eurasianet of 22 September 2022. “The rise and fall of Azerbaijan’s Goycha-Zangazur Republic”, online: https://eurasianet.org/the-rise-and-fall-of-azerbaijans-goycha-zangazur-republic
⁹ see David Nutt. “Report shows near-total erasure of Armenian heritage sites”, Cornell Chronicle of 12 September 2022, online: https://news.cornell.edu/stories/2022/09/report-shows-near-total-erasure-armenian-heritage-sites
¹⁰ see “Dadivank”, online:http://www.raa.am/Dadivanq/Dadivanq_E_1.htm and Regnum. «В старинном монастыре Нагорного Карабаха обнаружены мощи одного из учеников Иисуса Христа», online: https://regnum.ru/news/863083.html
¹¹ see his Twitter-notice (translated from turkish) at https://twitter.com/Mustafa_Destici/status/1570379659476619265. Promptly, some NGOs raised genocide alarms, including Nat Hill on 23 September 2022. “Genocide Warning: Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh”, genocidewatch online: https://www.genocidewatch.com/single-post/genocide-warning-azerbaijan-and-nagorno-karabakh-september-2022
¹² cf. Hovhannes Gevorkian. “Der Gas-Deal mit Aserbaidschan ist eine politische Bankrotterklärung”, Jacobin of 30 September 2022, online: https://jacobin.de/artikel/der-gas-deal-mit-aserbaidschan-ist-eine-politische-bankrotterklaerung-armenien-gaslieferung-eu-von-der-leyen-putin-alijew-Hovhannes-Gevorkian/
¹³ see Garden of the Righteous worldwide: EVERYTHING INDICATES THAT BRUSSELS IS READY TO SACRIFICE ARMENIA ON THE ALTAR OF ITS ENERGY INTERESTS, 28 September 2022, online: https://en.gariwo.net/texts-and-contexts/genocide-prevention/everything-indicates-that-brussels-is-ready-to-sacrifice-armenia-on-the-altar-of-its-energy-interests-25339.html
¹⁴ see Reuters of 18 September 2022. “Pelosi condemns Azerbaijan’s attacks on Armenia”, online: https://www.reuters.com/world/pelosi-condemns-illegal-attacks-by-azerbaijan-armenia-2022-09-18/ and Ashley Capoot. “Speaker Pelosi strongly condemns illegal and deadly attacks by Azerbaijan during visit to Armenia”, CNBC of 18 September 2022, online: https://www.reuters.com/world/pelosi-condemns-illegal-attacks-by-azerbaijan-armenia-2022-09-18/

* Ralph Bosshard studied General History, Eastern European History and Military History, completed the Military Command School of the ETH Zurich and the General Staff Training of the Swiss Army. This was followed by language training in Russian at the Moscow State University and training at the Military Academy of the General Staff of the Russian Army. He is familiar with the situation in Eastern Europe from his six years at the OSCE, where he was, among other things, Special Advisor to the Swiss Permanent Representative.