25 years ago – ICE disaster in Eschede

25 years ago, the world’s worst accident involving a high-speed train happened in Germany: Due to a faulty wheel tyre, which probably broke due to a lack of maintenance, an Intercity-Express (ICE) derailed near the town of Eschede in Lower Saxony on 3 June 1998. driving under a bridge at 200 km/h. 101 passengers lost their lives, more than 100 were seriously injured. 25 years later, Heinrich Löwen, who lost his wife and daughter in the tragedy, published a book in which he addresses the lack of support for the bereaved families by Deutsche Bahn AG (DB) and the sluggish processing of the disaster. The publication, sponsored by German Railways (DB), is also an occasion to take a look at the current state of DB.

Already two months after the accident, a privity was founded by the bereaved families lead by the author, in order to better cope with the disaster, not only emotionally, but also in terms of thorough investigation of the causes, legal clarification of responsibilities and financial settlements. It soon became clear that the people affected (victims) had a thorny path ahead of them.

The “Self-Help Eschede”
takes up its work

German Rail did not approach the bereaved families, offered them a much too small amount as a kind of compensation for their pain and suffering, did not publicly apologise, offered psychosocial support, which hardly found any positive response, and did not show that it wanted to have the technical causes of the accident thoroughly investigated. After several failed talks with the railway management, “Self-Help Eschede” takes legal action. In 2001, a claim for damages is finally filed with the court, which is rejected two years later.
  It was not until 2013 that the railway deeply regretted the accident and asked the bereaved families to apologise “for the human suffering caused” (p. 33). It is decided that the organisation will assist in the final design of a dignified memorial that warns “against excessive faith in technology” and urges “high awareness in the interest of people” (p. 35). From now on, all ICE trains “pass Eschede at the time of the accident at a greatly reduced speed, a nice gesture of respect” (p. 36).

The disaster and
its consequences in court –
an obstacle course for those affected

As early as November 1998, suspicions had leaked out in the press that there had been safety deficiencies. But it was not until four years later that three engineers were indicted: “They were charged with negligence and thus responsibility for 101 deaths and over 100 injuries” (p. 54). They had not sufficiently tested the newly used (rubber-sprung) wheels for their load-bearing capacity and had not had them regularly checked, which had the fatal consequence that an overstressed wheel caused the disaster. It remained completely incomprehensible that no member of the DB board and no responsible person from the maintenance and servicing sector was held accountable. The legal dispute increasingly took on the character of an “expert symposium on material strength” and “on the stressing of steel tyres under load” (p. 57). The court finally came to the conclusion that the defendants were “not seriously guilty”, a continuation of the trial would take “elaborate investigations of about one and a half to two years” (p. 58). The defendants agreed to a fine of 10,000 euros each, the public prosecutor’s office refused to “relentlessly clarify the facts and establish the guilt [...] of DB’s management board (ibid.).

Compensation for pain
and suffering and help for survivors

A claim for compensation for pain and suffering also faced difficulties: Instead of this term, the term “special grant” was used and for cost reasons it was only pursued in one instance. Finally, the payment of 30,000 DM (15,000 Euro) for each death was achieved, without taking into account the number of survivors. But that is not all: Even the construction of a dignified memorial with the naming of all 101 fatalities on granite memorial plaques and the planting of 101 cherry trees would not have been realised without the tireless work of “Self-Help Eschede”. And finally, the authorities lacked commitment when it came to obtaining rapid and unbureaucratic help for many survivors to overcome serious health damage and reintegrate into working life, albeit often under very different circumstances.

German Railways – a disaster

DB’s infrastructure is in alarming condition and not up to the demands of quality and capacity: 33,500 kilometres of track with bridges, points, level crossings and signal boxes urgently need to be renovated because far too little has been invested in recent years (much less than in Switzerland and Austria, for example), and mind you, at the same time as traffic is increasing! Consequently, there are countless road works and diversions on the routes, which are responsible for 80% of the countless delays. In 2022, every third long-distance train was late, i.e. only 65% of the trains were on time. Because the capacity of the rail network is nowhere near sufficient to shift heavy traffic from road to rail, the construction volume is constantly growing – a vicious circle.
  In Switzerland, people are lamenting the fatal consequences for the “Neat”, “The New Alpine Transversal”, agreed in 1996, the aim of which is to shift transit traffic in the north-south direction to the railways. Germany is hopelessly behind schedule; the Basel-Karlsruhe link is not expected to be completed until 2041.

Ambitious goals,
far-reaching measures

The federal government’s goals are ambitious: it wants to invest 45 billion euros in the highly indebted Bahn AG, which it owns, by 2027. Part of the toll fees for lorries is also to flow into the expansion of rail transport. By 2030, passenger traffic is to be doubled and 25% of freight traffic is to be shifted to the railways from 19% today.
  The German railways not only organise regional, long-distance and freight transport, but they also maintain the rail network. That is too much of a good thing, also in the opinion of the traffic light coalition. From 2024, the rail network, the stations and the energy sector are to be separated from the group and combined in a so-called infrastructure sector, which is to be managed by a “common good-oriented infrastructure company». It is to be wished for our northern neighbour and Europe that the measures will soon take effect …  •

Sources:

Gafafer, Tobias. “Deutschlands Bahnnetz ist marode – Italien macht es besser. Die Schweiz sollte mehr nach Süden schauen statt nach Norden” (Germany’s railway network is in a state of disrepair – Italy is doing better. Switzerland should look more to the south instead of the north). In: Neue Zürcher Zeitung of 11 May 2023

Kranz, Beate. “Bahn will pünktlicher werden: Das sind die grössten Probleme” (Railways want to become more punctual: These are the biggest problems), In: Berliner Morgenpost of 30 March 2023, https://www.morgenpost.de/wirtschaft/article238033789/deutsche-bahn-probleme-zuege-verkehr-strecken.html

Löwen, Heinrich. ICE 884 – nach der Katastrophe von Eschede – Erinnerungen, Erfahrungen und Erkenntnisse, aufgezeichnet zum 25. Jahrestag am 3. Juni 2023 (ICE 884 – after the Eschede disaster – memories, experiences and insights, recorded on the 25th anniversary on 3 June 2023) Schrobenhausen o.J., (www.bahnbuch.de), ISBN 978-3-9825491-0-1

German TV ARD. “Plusminus” of 17 May 2023, Chaos auf der Schiene – Wie das Netz der Bahn besser werden könnte” (Chaos on the rails – How the railway network could be improved), https://www.daserste.de/information/wirtschaft-boerse/plusminus/videos/chaos-auf-der-schiene-100.html

“Chaos auf der Schiene – Wie das Netz der Bahn besser werden könnte” (Chaos on the rails – How the railway network could be improved); https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/video/video-1196748.html