ts. In the USA, the voices of those who advocate an end to the war in Ukraine are increasing. Recently, the think tank RAND Corporation (R-AN-D is an acronym for research and development) published a study entitled “Avoiding a Long War in Ukraine”.1 The lead states: “U.S. interests would be best served by avoiding a protracted conflict. […] Although Washington cannot by itself determine the war’s duration, it can take steps that make an eventual negotiated end to the conflict more likely.” Four policy instruments are being presented “the United States could use to mitigate these impediments: clarifying plans for future support to Ukraine, making commitments to Ukraine’s security, issuing assurances regarding the country’s neutrality, and setting conditions for sanctions relief for Russia”.
But who is this think tank that is now suddenly bringing up the issue of Ukraine’s neutrality again, a demand made by Russia even before 24 February 2022?
Consulting the website of the RAND Corporation, the following is to be read: “On May 14, 1948, Project RAND – an organization formed immediately after World War II to connect military planning with research and development decisions – separated from the Douglas Aircraft Company of Santa Monica, California, and became an independent, nonprofit organization. […] World War II revealed the importance of technology research and development for success on the battlefield. It also drew attention to the wide range of scientists and academics outside the military who made such development possible.” And we further learn: “Adopting its name from a contraction of the term research and development, the newly formed entity was dedicated to furthering and promoting scientific, educational, and charitable purposes for the public welfare and security of the United States.”2
Strategies of Russia’s Destabilisation and Reflections on War with China
Furthermore, we find that RAND is “a non-profit institution that helps improve policy and decisionmaking through research and analysis.” And: “As a nonpartisan organisation, RAND is widely respected for operating independent of political and commercial pressures. Our core values are quality and objectivity.” Not only was the think tank concerned about the well-being of the US, but also people around the world: “RAND is a research organization that develops solutions to public policy challenges to help make communities throughout the world safer and more secure, healthier and more prosperous.”3
If you take a look at Wikipedia, it sounds more critical: it reads that “the non-profit organisation RAND Corporation was founded with the support of the Ford Foundation”. And: “RAND experts played a role in the Korean War and in Cold War propaganda”. The main objective was to advise the US military. RAND employs over 1880 people from 50 different countries. “Of the 2020 revenue of $ 349 million, about 55 % comes from the Department of Defence budget or the US armed forces. Other government agencies contribute about 27 % of the revenue. The rest is distributed among universities, non-governmental organisations, foundations, non-profit organisations, and the private sector. Research accounts for most of the expenditure (75 %).” Even more the following Wikipedia entry makes you keen-eared: “Among the topics worked on by RAND in recent years were strategies for destabilising Russia and considerations for war with China, as well as future requirements for military aircraft construction and protection possibilities against terrorist attacks.” But social issues also were taken up, such as “the growing obesity in the USA or the problem of drug abuse in American high schools.”4
If one searches for the mentioned studies on “Russia’s destabilisation”, one comes across the two texts “Overextending and Unbalancing Russia” of 20195 and “Extending Russia. Competing from Advantageous Ground”, also of 2019.6
2019 RAND Report I:
Overextending and Unbalancing Russia
About the first report the introductory summary on the RAND website says: “This brief summarises a report that comprehensively examines nonviolent, cost-imposing options that the United States and its allies could pursue across economic, political, and military areas to stress – overextend and unbalance – Russia’s economy and armed forces and the regime’s political standing at home and abroad.” Despite Russia’s vulnerabilities as analysed by RAND, “Russia remains a powerful country that still manages to be a U.S. peer competitor in a few key domains. Recognising that some level of competition with Russia is inevitable, RAND researchers conducted a qualitative assessment of ‘cost-imposing options’ that could unbalance and overextend Russia. Such cost-imposing options could place new burdens on Russia, ideally heavier burdens than would be imposed on the United States for pursuing those options.” This assessment by the US think tank in 2019 is unlikely to have gone unnoticed in Moscow.
RAND Report 2019 II:
Overextend Russia Militarily and Economically
The second report mentioned by Wikipedia, “Extending Russia: Competing from Advantageous Ground”, was written with funding from army agencies, according to the RAND website. The RAND website goes on to say: “The purpose of the project was to examine a range of possible means to extend Russia. By this, we mean nonviolent measures that could stress Russia’s military or economy or the regime’s political standing at home and abroad. The steps we posit would not have either defense or deterrence as their prime purpose, although they might contribute to both. Rather, these steps are conceived of as measures that would lead Russia to compete in domains or regions where the United States has a competitive advantage, causing Russia to overextend itself militarily or economically or causing the regime to lose domestic and/or international prestige and influence. This report deliberately covers a wide range of military, economic, and political policy options. Its recommendations are directly relevant to everything from military modernisation and force posture to economic sanctions and diplomacy”.
This analysis is also unlikely to have been taken lightly in Moscow.
“Smart power” 2019 – and today?
And this same RAND Corporation that provided the above analyses in the best “smart power” manner – the term was coined by Joseph S. Nye7, touted by Hillary Clinton as the Obama administration’s foreign policy doctrine8 – now provides a new analysis.
The entire report cannot be printed here, but it is available free of charge as a PDF file on the homepage of the RAND Foundation.9 Here we are content with reproducing the report’s conclusion (see box). You can be curious to see in how far the US government will adopt the recommendation of the army-affiliated think tank in the coming weeks and months. •
1 https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PEA2510-1.html
2 https://www.rand.org/about/history.html
3 https://www.rand.org/about.html
4 https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/RAND_Corporation
5 https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB10014.html
6 https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR3000/RR3063/RAND_RR3063.pdf
7 e. g., Joseph S. Nye, Jr. “Get Smart: Combining Hard and Soft Power”. In: Foreign Affairs, Vol. 88, No. 4 (July/August 2009), pp. 160–163. Published by: Council on Foreign Relations.
8 before her appointment as Secretary of State under Barack Obama in her hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 15 January 2009. cf. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PNQQyKBml04
9 cf. Fn 1
Four options available to the US according to the RAND Corporation
“[…] The debate in Washington and other Western capitals over the future of the Russia-Ukraine war privileges the issue of territorial control. Hawkish voices argue for using increased military assistance to facilitate the Ukrainian military’s reconquest of the entirety of the country’s territory. Their opponents urge the United States to adopt the pre-February 2022 line of control as the objective, citing the escalation risks of pushing further. Secretary of State Antony Blinken has stated that the goal of U.S. policy is to enable Ukraine “to take back territory that’s been seized from it since February 24.” Our analysis suggests that this debate is too narrowly focused on one dimension of the war’s trajectory. Territorial control, although immensely important to Ukraine, is not the most important dimension of the war’s future for the United States. We conclude that, in addition to averting possible escalation to a Russia-NATO war or Russian nuclear use, avoiding a long war is also a higher priority for the United States than facilitating significantly more Ukrainian territorial control. Furthermore, the U.S. ability to micromanage where the line is ultimately drawn is highly constrained since the U.S. military is not directly involved in the fighting. Enabling Ukraine’s territorial control is also far from the only instrument available to the United States to affect the trajectory of the war.
We have highlighted several other tools – potentially more potent ones – that Washington can use to steer the war toward a trajectory that better promotes U.S. interests. Whereas the United States cannot determine the territorial outcome of the war directly, it will have direct control over these policies. President Biden has said that this war will end at the negotiating table. But the administration has not yet made any moves to push the parties toward talks. Although it is far from certain that a change in U.S. policy can spark negotiations, adopting one or more of the policies described in this Perspective could make talks more likely. We identify reasons why Russia and Ukraine may have mutual optimism about war and pessimism about peace. The literature on war termination suggests that such perceptions can lead to protracted conflict. Therefore, we highlight four options the United States has for shifting these dynamics: clarifying its plans for future support to Ukraine, making commitments to Ukraine’s security, issuing assurances regarding the country’s neutrality, and setting conditions for sanctions relief for Russia. A dramatic, overnight shift in U.S. policy is politically impossible – both domestically and with allies – and would be unwise in any case. But developing these instruments now and socializing them with Ukraine and with U.S. allies might help catalyze the eventual start of a process that could bring this war to a negotiated end in a time frame that would serve U.S. interests. The alternative is a long war that poses major challenges for the United States, Ukraine, and the rest of the world.”
Source: https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PEA2510-1.html
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