“The world cannot be that eurocentric as it used to be in the past”

ev. “You just don’t get it,” Kishore Mahbubani, a political scientist, diplomat, and professor at the National University of Singapore, put it in “Die Zeit” a few years ago: The West does not understand that the world is fundamentally changing in the 21^st century – and has already changed. Washington and its transatlantic supporters still cleave to the idea of maintaining their hegemony. According to Mahbubanim – by all means also a friend of the West – a wise policy would be to take note of the reality, to adapt to it and to shape the transition to a multipolar world in such a way that it does not become traumatic for the West’s own people, but is as beneficial as possible.
  At present, the West seems to be far from doing so. We are not really taking note of developments. The arrogance of hegemonic claims seems to obscure the view of the reality, the processes and developments in other regions of the world. Take India, for example. The following excerpt from a conversation with the Indian foreign minister, Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, gives a small impression of what is going on. Here one encounters a new, self–confident India that does not want to let anyone dictate how it positions itself in the world. An India that rejects the Western construct of “the West and the Rest”, of the “garden” versus the “jungle” (Josep Borrell), “democracy” versus » autocracy» as the hegemonic claim of the West to have to place itself on its, on the “right side”, and wants to and does go its own way.
  As part of a multi–day trip to Central and Eastern European countries, Indian Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar fielded questions from the moderator and audience at GLOBSEC 2022 in Bratislava on June 3 (see box). Below are the statements, slightly shortened and edited for readability.
  In response to the moderator’s introductory question to sketch a picture of India’s current situation – she mentions the Ukraine war, which is now not only preoccupying Europe and the West, but is also “seeping into the rest of the world”; she also mentions the keywords Covid, India’s relationship with China, the economic situation in difficult times – the Indian Foreign Minister comments as follows, first on Covid:

Enormous developmental steps

“Yes, we are largely out of Covid, with a strong sense of economic recovery. There’s a lot of optimism, not just about rebuilding, but actually leapfrogging [economically leap across several developmental steps] in many areas, particularly digital.
  I think we handled it [Covid], very prudently. I’m almost tempted to say smartly in terms of the financial responses, which was that we didn’t blow up [meaning that we haven’t destroyed] the [central] bank [the RBI Reserve Bank of India] in responding, we intervened where we had to, and very effectively. At the moment, the Modi government has just completed eight years in office, and what we have done in those eight years is really to build, I would say, a social welfare society at a speed and to a scale that the world has not seen.
  In some ways, Covid has actually hastened that. For example, we are giving food support to 800 million people, and we’ve been doing this for more than two years – that’s as much as for the population of the US and the EU together.
  We have a publicly supported house ownership program which covers about 115 million beneficiaries, which is almost like building houses for Japan.
  Or even if you look at the program to replace cooking with firewood with cooking with gas, that impacts 80 million people, that’s like changing Germany’s kitchens in the space of a few years.
  So there’s a lot going on there, and why I mentioned that is because many of the global developments today have the potential of actually put that [development] under stress.

Things are happening in the world
that Europe pays too little attention to

Your second reference was to China. Yes, we are going through a particularly difficult patch in our relationship with China. We’ve had differences in the past, but we’ve never had a situation since 1962 where agreements on not bringing forces to the border have been disregarded.¹
  We have had a clash in which people have died. However, this has not happened now, it happened two years ago. So, in a sense [addressing those events today] is a bit a diversion. But it’s also a useful reminder to Europe that there are other things happening in the rest of the world which Europe perhaps sometimes doesn’t pay enough attention to.
  And there has also been Afghanistan, you know, what happened there, the circumstances in which the Western, particularly American military forces, left finally.
  And now we have Ukraine. And coming into this region [the Central and Eastern European countries], it’s a region which I know well, I have lived here – in Budapest and Prague. It’s a region that has been very helpful to us when we wanted 20,000 students out of Ukraine, Slovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, even Moldova.
  But I think it’s also important for people in this region to realise how this [the war in Ukraine] is playing out to the rest of the world, that it is creating a huge fuel crisis, a food crisis, a fertiliser crisis, and it’s pushing inflation in low–income societies which don’t have the margins to absorb that development. And so it can very quickly become political in many societies.»

On behalf of an online viewer, the question follows to what extent the population is interested in the war in Ukraine – apart from gasoline and food shortages.
S. Jaishankar: „I think it’s a major concern, a major concern, for two reasons. Look, today our existence is very connected, and everybody sees things on TV, on their phones, on the net, wherever you are. And bear in mind that India today is a very digital society, even people at lower levels of income – the one thing they do have is connectivity [i.e., Internet access]. So there is a lot of awareness.
  I think everybody is, to put it mildly, disturbed at the conflict. I think you see the pictures, they see that happening. But the other part is, that it has begun to impact people’s daily lives: either it is impacting the petrol cost or at the bank, it’s impacting your wheat cost or your shopping. It impacts farmers to get along with sowing. And when it impacts businesses, which it affects in multiple ways – I mean you know, there’s a container problem, there’s an insurance problem, you don’t get certain commodities or if you do, the prices are up – so it is disrupting life. And it [the situation in Ukraine] is not unique causal of disruption. At the same time, I think some of the lockdowns in China also have an economic impact. But when you disrupt the  economy, it shows up in employment – so I think it does trouble people.»

All countries have a right to
provide for the welfare of their people

The next question revolves around criticism of the increase in Indian oil imports from Russia at cheap prices and how India could reconcile nine times higher oil imports between 2021 and 2022 with non–alignment in foreign policy.
S. Jaishankar: „Well, first of all, honestly, I don’t see a non–alignment oil connection at all. I mean, today Europe is buying oil, Europe is buying gas. I just read the new lot of the new package of [EU]sanctions. Now the package is designed in a way in which consideration has been given to the welfare of the [European] population. So the pipelines have a certain carve–out [where parts of companies are outsourced], and timelines have been given. It’s not like tomorrow morning everything is going to be cut off. People need to understand that if you can be considerate of yourself, surely you can be considerate of other people.
  So if Europe says, we have to manage it in a way, in which the impact on my economy is not traumatic, then that freedom or that choice should exist for other people as well. Now, in terms of our oil purchases: We don’t send people out there saying ‚go buy Russian oil’, we send people out saying ‚go buy oil’. Now you buy the best oil you can in the market. – I don’t think I would attach a political messaging to that.»

At this point, the moderator interrupts with the objection of how this is supposed to work, not to bring the two aspects into a context. India has strong relations with Russia, but also problems with China, and then literally: “How do you then sit back and define Indian foreign policy at this point where the West seems to be quite vociferous in trying to curtail the funding for the war [on the part of Russia] in Ukraine, whereas purchasing this oil for national interest, India is being asked: ‘Are you funding this war?’
S. Jaishankar: „I don’t want to sound argumentative, but then tell me: buying Russian gas does not finance the war? Why is it only Indian money and oil coming to India that is financing [the war], but not gas coming to Europe? I mean, let’s be a little even–handed out here.
  And you know, the whole narrative of [oil imports] that have gone nine times up. That’s gone nine times up from a very low base, and it was a very low base because at that time the markets were more open. You know why. If countries in Europe and the West and the United States are so concerned, why don’t they allow Iranian oil to come into the market? Why don’t they allow Venesuelan oil to come into the market? I mean, they have squeezed every other source of oil we have, and then they say, ‘Okay, guys, you must not go to the market and guess the best deal for your people.’ I don’t think that’s a very fair approach.»

Wheat export bans:
measures against price speculation at the expense of the poor

Addressing India’s export bans on wheat and food as another Western criticism of India’s foreign policy – whether that doesn’t put pressure on the most vulnerable in the global South and East, and whether India sees that as supporting Russia [a], or whether [b] „it is a completely different element, that we in the West don’t understand that your perspective is different?»
S. Jaishankar: „I think the answer is b: You don’t understand in the West. But it isn’t just the West, okay? I think people don’t understand because they are not actually tracking the trade. We have been exporting wheat, okay. Typically we export about two to three million tons. Last year – last fiscal year was a better year – we exported about 7 million tons. This year, before the heat wave hit us very badly, the expectation was that we would do substantial exports, and we were open. In fact, the prime minister himself said on various occasions, we see that there is a food crisis in the world, and we would like to be of help. But what we then saw was a kind of run on our wheat, a large part of it done by international traders based out of Singapore and, I think, to some degree maybe Dubai. The result was that the low–income countries, many of whom were our traditional buyers, like our neighbors Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Nepal, [were pushed out]. Interestingly, the Gulf region buys regularly from us. Yemen buys from us, Sudan buys from us. Now what we saw was that the low–income buyers were being squeezed out. The wheat was being stocked for being traded, so in a way our good will was being used for speculation. So we had to do something to stop that because it was also affecting us at home. Our prices went up. I want to be very clear about what we did: We actually said that we would not give speculators open access to the Indian market, which would leave the Indian customer and the least developed countries in the world with the short end of that. What we are still open to doing is: where we see a kind of a ‚deserving’ country wanting wheat we are very glad to supply it within the realm of our means. And just for the record: I think we have done this year wheat export to about 23 countries. The rate of export this year – if I were to take the same period as last year – my rough sense is that it is about 4x. So actually it’s gone up. I know of many cases where foreign ministers of some countries have called and we have assured them that they would have access to our market.»

The moderator asks, „So it’s all about stopping and curtailing speculation et the end.»
S. Jaishankar: „That’s right – and preventing a diversion to high–income countries with a greater possibility to buy. Because what we saw happen with the vaccines, we don’t want to see happen with the wheat – which was the rich people got vaccinated and the poor were left to God.»

Question from the Online-audience: “According to the ‘Wall Street Journal’ India is becoming a key point for transshipment for Russian oil to bypass sanctions from the US. How does that serve Indias foreign policy interests?”
S. Jaishankar: “I don’t know if whoever wrote that knows what transhipment means. I mean, transhipment is when you get something and then you sell it to somebody else. I have not even heard of anybody in India thinking along those lines. So, yes, we do buy…”

The moderator interjects: “Saying, the ‘Wall Street Journal’ report is inaccurate that they are quoting.”
S. Jaishankar: “Politely, yes. I can say it less politely, but …”

The moderator: “Not a conduit to any Russian oil transaction …”
S. Jaishankar: “No. Listen – please understand the oil markets. There is a enormous shortage of oil. There is a physical shortage of oil. Getting access to oil is difficult. A country like India would be crazy to get oil from somebody and sell it to somebody else. I mean, this is nonsense.”

A freelance journalist from Lithuania wants to know how India can count on global support in the conflict with China and believe others will still trust India after it did not condemn Russia and did not take sanctions.
S. Jaishankar: “You know, that’s an interesting question that maybe, I don’t mean you personally, but people should ask themselves. When I look at Europe as a whole, which has been extraordinarily silent on many things that have happened in Asia, for example, one might ask why anyone in Asia should trust Europe at all.
  So here is the take. First of all, I think you are mischaracterising our position. For example, when Bucha happened, we condemned Bucha and we actually asked for an investigation into Bucha. In terms of what is happening with the Ukraine conflict, our position is very clear that we favour an immediate cessation of hostilities – it is not that we have ignored it, unless you call phone calls with Putin and Selensky ignoring something. So first I would urge you, to get the factual position accurately.
  Secondly, in terms of the connection you are making, you know we have a difficult relationship with China. We are perfectly capable of managing it. If I get global understanding and support, obviously, it is of help to me. But this idea that I do a transaction [make a deal], that I come in a conflict because it will help me in a conflict too – that’s not how the world works. A lot of our problems in China have nothing to do with Ukraine, they have nothing to do with Russia, they are predated. And if we are getting into who is silent on what issue at what point of time, I could point to a whole lot of issues on which Europe has a sort of held its space. So, I mean, it is a great polemical point you made. I take it in that spirit.”

The moderator goes on to say that a key question in Western political and financial circles is which side India will take in the conflict between the United States and China, should such a decision one day have to be made.
S. Jaishankar: “First, and I am partly reacting to the previous observation, somewhere Europe has to grow out of the mindset that Europe’s problems are the world’s problems, but the world’s problems are not Europe’s problems – [along the lines of] if it’s you (the rest of the world), it’s yours. If it’s me (Europe), it’s ours. I see reflections of that also in the linkage which is being made today between China and India and what’s happening in Ukraine. So come on, guys, China and India happened way before anything happened in Ukraine. So, the Chinese don’t need anybody anywhere in the world to tell them how to engage us or not engage us, or to be difficult with us or not difficult with us. I see that as a frankly, not a very clever argument, as a very self-serving one. And to this idea that your grand strategy must be about how you will choose: I (India) will do what all of us do. I’m going to weigh the situation, as everybody does. After all: how do countries eventually make decisions?”

India does not join any “axis” –
 it goes its own way

The moderator responded again, “There will always be two axes at this point. It’s an understood accepted fact that you have the West, U.S.–led and you have China as the next potential access. Where does India fit into this. Are you planning to not do this …”
S. Jaishankar: “No, I’m sorry, that’s exactly where I disagree with you, this is the construct you are trying to impose on me, and I don’t accept it. I don’t think it’s necessary for me to join this axis or not, and if I am not joining this I must be with the other one. I don’t accept that. I mean, I am one fifth of the world’s population. I [and here he is speaking, of course, for India, with which he identifies] am the fifth or sixth largest economy in the world today, I mean, forget the history of civilization, everybody knows that, but I think I am entitled to have my own side, I am entitled to weigh my own interests, to make my own choices – and my choices will not be cynical and transactional², but they will be a balance between my values and my interests. There is no country in the world that disregards its interests.”

Not block thinking –
Solutions the world needs

As the moderator again follows up that India has to position itself after all if it wants to play a role in the world, non-alignment is “not plausible if you want to take a position on the world stage”, standing aside, “sitting on the fence” is not an option to play a leading role in the world, the Indian foreign minister elaborates:
“Look, I don’t think we are sitting on the fence. Just because I don’t agree with you doesn’t make me sitting on the fence; it means I’m sitting on my ground. And that is, what are the big challenges of the world? One of them is climate change: I think India is very critical to the solution, I can be an example, I can actually be an arena for an enormous leapfrogging of green technologies. Look at terrorism, look at the emergence of a world order, look at security, look at sustainable development goals – if you take any of the world’s big challenges, part of the answer can either come from India, or India can contribute to it. I hate to say it – it is a bit like a broken record: a lot of things are happening outside Europe. We have – partly because of climate change – for a lot of humanitarian natural disasters humanitarian responses, today, in our part of the world. A lot of people look to us to help out. The days when they expected Europe to come – which Europe did at the time of the tsunami in 2004 – are over. The difference is that today nobody is even thinking about it. The world is changing, new players are coming, new capabilities are coming, but a new agenda must come, the world cannot be as Eurocentric as it used to be in the past.”  •

¹ For decades, there has been disagreement between China and India over the border between India’s high mountain territory of Ladakh and the Chinese-controlled Tibet Autonomous Region. In June 2020, a bloody clash occurred there, the worst incident since the border war of 20 October 1962–20 November 1962.
² thus not in the sense of a business cost–benefit calculation

Source: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=APOFAsaxWSc

(Edited by Current Concerns)