Our army secured peace for Switzerland peace during the Second World War (Part 1)

In the “Neue Zürcher Zeitung” of 10 March 2023, several letters to the editor were published under the title “Switzerland of the masochists” dealing with questions of neutrality, army and security policy. Among them one finds the assertion that not our army, but our “business” (supply of weapons and ammunition) with Nazi Germany had kept it from attacking our country. Those who claim this were certainly born after the Second World War, in contrast to the author of this answer, who experienced this time very consciously as a youngster. In the following it will be shown that this statement is not correct in this regard.

In war, everything is at stake for the peoples concerned. It must be won under all circumstances. All other considerations, concerns, even morality, are secondary. It is not surprising, therefore, that all the significant armies deployed in Western Europe, including the armed forces of democratic states friendly to Switzerland, considered an attack on Switzerland (the French as early as 1937, the British, the Italians and, after arriving in Europe, the United States). But all concluded that our army was too strong for a successful attack. To show this, key sentences from attack plans on our country of all major powers involved are reproduced.

Attack plans against Switzerland –
the motives of different countries

The main reasons for possible attacks on our country were different: ideological (creation of the Greater German Reich), elimination of one of the last major non-German friendly armies in Western Europe, takeover of our North-South and East-West transversals, takeover of our economy, a possible occupation of Switzerland to forestall one by the enemy, etc.
  It is true that Switzerland supplied arms and even more things to Germany, but also to Great Britain and other countries. For example, at the time of the great German air raids on Great Britain, it had reinforced its fleet with 1500 anti-aircraft guns by the end of 1940. Most importantly and urgently, however, the country needed a large number of Swiss machine tools for its own armaments industry, which we also supplied. Since the USA also needed such machines, they even concluded an economic compensation agreement with Switzerland at the end of 1942. In its agreements with Germany, Switzerland continually reduced the volume of mutual trade, most recently on June 29, 1944, to as little as 20% of the deliveries at the beginning of the war.
  As long as there are wars, potential attackers on Switzerland will ask themselves – as they have in the past – the questions:

• Do the Swiss people want to defend themselves?
• Does it therefore have the necessary army?

France: hesitation, waiting, defeat – despite military superiority

Germany attacked France and the Benelux countries on May 10, 1940. Both sides had a total of about 140 divisions each, including 10 British and 20 Belgian on the Allied side. Of all the heavy weapons – guns, tanks, fighter planes – the French army possessed considerably more than the German Wehrmacht. Moreover, the French tanks were far superior to the German ones on the battlefield. France also still had its mighty Maginot fortification line on the border with Germany, while Germany had begun building the 650 km long Siegfried Line on the opposite side only shortly before the outbreak of war.
  In 1939, Hitler initially had only 34 divisions on the Western Front, of which only 12 were ready for war, since the bulk of the Wehrmacht was deployed for the war against Poland (September 1–28, 1939). Hitler feared a French attack during this time and inquired daily whether such an attack had begun. It was only after Poland’s defeat that Hitler was able to commit a large number of troops to the attack on France.

Missed opportunity –
consequences for Switzerland

France had not seized its unique opportunity to end the war quickly by attacking Germany, which was initially far inferior in the West. This was not only a strategic mistake, but also a breach of contract, since it had committed itself by treaty to support Poland and Czechoslovakia with its own troops in the event of an attack. Czechoslovakia with its army in case of attack. (Both had already been attacked by Germany.) Its army was completely demoralized.
  This had also been noted in April 1940 by a Swiss officer mission under Col. Samuel Gonard, which General Guisan had delegated to the French army with the task of preparing cooperation in the event of a German attack. However, after the shockingly negative impression the French army made on them, they came to the conclusion that our country would have to defend itself alone.
  Switzerland then prepared to go it alone with Operation Order No. 13 of May 24, 1941, which triggered the construction of the réduit. At the entrances of the réduit, it built the big national fortifications, St. Maurice, Gotthard and Sargans. The bulk of the army was moved to the réduit with its 16 wartime airfields and fortresses, and preparations were made for the disabling of industry, the blowing up of all major bridges, tunnels and roads, and much more. On July 25, 1940, General Guisan summoned all Swiss officers from Major on to the Rütli Report and ordered “readiness for unconditional resistance” at the cradle of the Swiss Confederation.
  “Das Reich”, the Nazi newspaper, wrote on July 22, 1941: “The Swiss can claim to be the only country in Europe where no volunteers (for the German Wehrmacht) can be recruited.” In all, only 2,000 Swiss, 75 % of them living in Germany, volunteered for service in the Wehrmacht. One, who first had to serve his sentence for this, then made up for the refresher courses he had missed during his participation in the Wehrmacht in Russia in the company led by the author. Because of his great war experience, the battalion commander, a professional officer, always called him in as an expert during inspections.
  Shortly after the beginning of the war, the army staff introduced vacations also for Jewish conscripts on their holidays. The German “Welt-Dienst”, financed by the state, commented as follows: “Switzerland can claim to be the only remaining Jewish paradise in Europe.”

June 1940 to September 1944:
Surrounded by Axis powers

The Swiss assessment of France’s army was already confirmed on 22 June 1940 by its surrender, only six weeks after the German attack of 10 May 1940. Until the arrival of the US troops at the border near Geneva on 7 September 1944, Switzerland was from then on completely surrounded by both Axis powers, and even by the German Wehrmacht after the surrender of Italy on 9 September 1943.
  In Switzerland, strict rationing had been introduced shortly after the start of the war because of the general shortage in all areas. Thanks to the cultivation battle, our degree of self-sufficiency in food could be increased in the course of the war years from an initial 50 % to 59 %. But 41 % of our needs still had to be imported from all over the world. The warring parties had to give their consent for this.

Tenacious negotiating skills

Especially from Germany, the latter could only be obtained in return for concessions from Switzerland. Switzerland was entirely dependent on Germany for vital imports, including coke and coal. Germany exploited this advantageous situation to force Switzerland to make concessions. Thus, towards the end of 1942, i.e. during the winter, it stopped the monthly export of 150,000 tonnes of coal per month in order to put us under pressure. At the beginning of 1943, Switzerland reacted by breaking off the negotiations. But Hitler then gave orders in March 1943 not to push the pressure on Switzerland so far that the negotiations broke down. On 23 June 1943, Switzerland ended the contract less state with a new agreement with Germany, at the same time reducing its delivery obligation by 20 %. (For lack of sufficient quantities of heating material, the central heating in the author’s parents’ house in Zurich froze in the wartime winter of 1943/44. The radiators burst under the pressure of the ice and the residual water flowed through the floors and walls to the lower floors).
  A large part of the Swiss gold and currency reserves were stored in the USA. On 21 June 1941, the USA blocked the credit balances and gold reserves of all continental European countries. Individual departments of the US government even demanded that Switzerland stop its trade with Germany altogether (probably unaware of Switzerland’s geo-graphical position in the middle of German-occupied Europe). But since the USA also urgently needed Swiss machine tools and precision machines, Switzerland was able to conclude an economic compensation agreement with them and Great Britain at the end of 1942.

Uniquely rapid mobilisation
capability of the Swiss Armed Forces

One of the strengths of the Swiss army was its very rapid mobilisation. After a visit to our country, the Lord Mayor of London wrote in the “Times” of 11 November 1938 that no army in the world could mobilise as quickly as the Swiss. He recommended that the British government adopt the Swiss system.
  In July 1938, the German General Staff Captain von Xylander (the later General) visited a live firing of Swiss mountain troops. His report on the event said: “The troops make a good impression. The soldiers work with passion and earnestness […], they are somewhat ponderous (Bernese Oberlanders), but very tough and strong and reliable […]. It must be acknowledged that the fire control and effect in firing the artillery as well as the heavy infantry weapons were very agile and remarkably good.”
  Acclimatisation (to the reality of the battlefield) is of great importance to all armies. In the German attack planning of the summer of 1943, the author General Böhme said on the subject: “If Switzerland succeeds in getting through the first two weeks (of a German attack), numerous troops accustomed to fire will be available.”
  The 1940 TANNENBAUM attack study stated that part of the Swiss border troops would be ready for combat within five hours, the border, mountain and light brigades in one day and the entire army in two days. According to a report by the German Chief of Staff, Halder, dated 27 March 1940, the Italian army needed two weeks to mobilise 20 divisions. In his war diary on 26 March 1940, he wrote “that bypassing the front through an undefended Switzerland would have been a tempting possibility”.
  On 4 October 1942, the attack planning of the German army of occupation in France warned against being misled by the small number of Swiss units that had just been mobilised, since the conscripts on leave were immediately ready for action again. A reference to our unique mobilisation system.

Réduit: strategy instead of conceptlessness

In response to Germany’s military domination of Europe, General Guisan created the Alpine Redoubt, or Réduit. The bulk of the army was now in the mountains. The emphasis of the subsequent German attack plans was now on occupying the Réduit entrances as quickly as possible with airborne troops in order to prevent the moving-in Swiss conscripts from reaching their areas of operations. Guisan reacted to this threat by having the Alpine crossings (bridges, tunnels, etc.) and the electricity supply, which were ready to be blown up, permanently secured by strong combat units, even when the bulk of the army had been demobilised. The production facilities in the country were prepared to be rendered useless by the practised removal of key elements (e. g. from machines).  •