by Karl-Jürgen Müller
Where to start? With the red-yellow-green German foreign policy, which pretends to be highly moral (“value-based”), but in fact violates many precepts of morality? With a political class constantly trying to lecture politicians in other countries – not only in faraway Brazil or China, but also its neighbours in Europe, including Switzerland – but itself seems to be completely unwilling to learn? With a very revealing interview in Bild am Sonntag of 23 April which once again shows that people in the east of the country probably think quite differently (with more realism?!) than in the West? With the reference to books that can stimulate one’s own reflection?
Or with the conclusion that Germany is in a kind of state of emergency – not only since 24 February 2022, but – oscillating – since its state formation in the 19th century. So that the good intentions and practical, also constitutional attempts since the end of the 18th century to create a free, constitutional, social and democratic, a rational, compassionate Germany aware of its history, which is involved in the community of nations on an equal base with other nations, have not been sustainably successful? And that a lot of perseverance is needed for all those who still love Germany?
An interview in Bild am Sonntag
What could be read in the Bild am Sonntag of 23 April?
The person interviewed was asked: “With few exceptions, new heating systems [in Germany] must be powered by at least 65 percent renewable energies from 2024. What do you think of the new law?”
He answered, “The law is made using a sledgehammer, and a lot of it is technically not feasible or cannot be implemented so fast. The red-yellow-green coalition thus is putting the prosperity of millions of people in Germany at risk. [...] Many citizens will simply not be able to afford the required retrofit of their little house or flat.” The energy turnaround will become “unaffordable for citizens” and politics will thus “lose a large part of the population. People are turning away because they are getting scared.”
The interviewee was asked if he was not exaggerating. His answer: “Not at all. The red-yellow-green coalition are just cancelling the balance of economy, ecology, and social issues. [...] The plans of this government led to deindustrialisation and to revolt among the population.” The Greens’ policy was “ecological madness”.
A planned-economy popular education approach
The interviewer mentioned that the Greens were doing quite well in elections. The answer: “Not in East Germany. The Greens have lost the trust of the population. [...] The economy is being stifled; many companies have postponed their investment decisions. There will be massive relocations away from Germany. We are cutting the branch that holds the prosperity of our country.” He said the red-yellow-green government was pursuing “a planned-economy popular-education approach”. It was “not looking for a social consensus”. The task of a government, however, was to “keep the country together and not to divide it”.
No more diplomacy
The interviewee was also asked whether he believed in an end to the Ukraine war this year.
His answer: “That also depends on the commitment of Germany and Europe to diplomatic solutions. [...] Now the Foreign Minister does not see the time for negotiations but for arms deliveries. That is something that disturbs many – me included. Diplomacy is always a means to pacify conflicts. I think it is wrong that Germany has abandoned this position. And the number of people in Germany who also see it that way is increasing every day.” [all emphasis km]
The interviewee is not a regular participant in East German Pegida demonstrations, but the Minister-President of the Free State of Saxony, Michael Kretschmer.
Reminder to the SED leadership
For a government willing to learn, even considering only half of the statements of this East German minister-president as sensible should be reason enough to start thinking and correcting its course. But there is no question of that in Germany. Understandably, this is reminding many East Germans of the final phase of GDR politics, of the obstinacy of the SED (Socialist Unity Party of Germany) leadership at that time.
But German politics, despite its massive deficits, still wants to lecture others. On 18 April, the German Chancellor Olaf Scholz tried it with the President of the Swiss Confederation, Alain Berset. At the beginning of the joint press conference he said, “Dear Alain, welcome to Berlin”. And: “Germany and Switzerland are not only very good neighbours and friends. Our countries are most closely connected […].”
Chancellor Scholz calls for Swiss allegiance
But then the spin: “Our connection is also shown by how closely we coordinate politically. We share many common values and positions. We stand up for democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the rule-based international order [!] – globally. Standing up together for these values has become even more important since 24 February 2022, the day of the Russian attack on Ukraine. With its brutal actions, Russia threatens not only Ukraine, but the entire European security architecture.”
It was not to be expected that the German chancellor would have learned in the meantime that not much of this is true. Perhaps he would have read the recently published book, edited by Hannes Hofbauer and Stefan Kraft, “Kriegsfolgen. Wie der Kampf um die Ukraine die Welt verändert” (War consequences. How the fight for Ukraine is changing the world) (ISBN 978-3-85371-511-6), and taken it seriously. Then he might have come to different conclusions.
Again and again: arms deliveries
But Chancellor Scholz has other things in mind. He took up his speech about the “turn of the times” and now addressed the Swiss guest directly: The “turn of the times” demanded “a lot from us. Germany had to say goodbye to years of certainties and is now supplying weapons to a war zone so that Ukraine can defend itself against Russian aggression. [...] This war in Europe challenges us all to critically examine our self-image and sometimes to be prepared to make uncomfortable but correct decisions.” For this reason, it was “a good sign that Switzerland is supporting the [illegal!] EU sanctions against Russia”. But that was not enough. Germany itself was determined to support Ukraine “also with weapons, as long as necessary”. In this context, “any support from our friends, be it direct or indirect, is always welcome”. And then: “To be honest, we are always counting on it.” That was not a renewed threat with the cavalry, but it was clear enough.
Where are the media with a Swiss perspective?
What is disconcerting: Criticism of the German pressure on Switzerland was not only non-existent in Germany, but also almost non-existent in the Swiss media world. On the contrary: SRF’s news on 18 April had Switzerland’s ex-ambassador to Germany, Tim Guldimann, doubling down: Switzerland’s previous neutrality policy was no longer in keeping with the times and should be put to the test. Swiss Radio SRF itself commented on the same day almost like a German government spokeswoman: “The goodwill of the German government towards Bern has already suffered because Switzerland let the framework agreement with the EU fall through. The doors in Berlin for Switzerland’s concerns are probably not quite as wide open as they used to be. If Bern doesn’t manage to explain itself better, Berlin’s traditional ties with its neighbour to the south will be quite challenged.”
“Blick” wrote on 18 April: “Switzerland’s stance in the Ukraine war is straining relations with Germany. Especially on the issue of arms deliveries, the northern neighbour is starting to lose patience.”
The “Neue Zürcher Zeitung” titled its editorial of 19 April: “Scholz spares Berset with criticism”. Nevertheless, the article repeated the massive criticism of Switzerland by German politicians. The Weltwoche commented on 20 April: “The NZZ has given away all trace elements of a Swiss view in its reporting from Berlin.” •
“As can be seen from this brief outline of Zelensky’s speeches, he presents the complex history of the Russia-Ukraine conflict as a simple story of Armageddon – the final battle between the forces of light and the forces of darkness. What makes this mythical frame of reference for the Russian-Ukrainian war extremely problematic is that it ignores all the important factors that must be taken into account if serious talks are to take place: the coup on the Maidan, the uprising in the Donbass, the Minsk Agreements, and so on and so forth. When all these facts are taken into account, the picture of the conflict appears much more complex, and it is the recognition of this high level of complexity that invites alternative visions of a peaceful solution. These visions should be embraced, not suppressed.
A peaceful solution is hard to find without the complexity of intellectual argumentation that populism lacks. Restoring intellectualism is not about restoring the Russian empire, as populism would have us believe. Zelensky’s one-dimensional and mythical account of the current catastrophe has little, if any, potential to bring about peace. By drawing firm dividing lines between the parties to the conflict, his simplistic portrayal excludes any possibility of a symbolic space necessary for communication. In order to create peace, this symbolic space must be restored – it is a necessary condition for negotiating differences and seeking compromise. The narrative of Armageddon must be abandoned because it does not include political solutions – it is about fighting to the end. Simplistic judgments are literally deadly, and humanity must realise this now, lest it be too late.”
From: Olga Baysha. Selenskis autoritärer Populismus: Vom Frieden zum Krieg
(Zelensky’s Authoritarian Populism: From Peace to War);
in: Hannes Hofbauer/Stefan Kraft (eds.). Kriegsfolgen. Wie der Kampf um die Ukraine die Welt verändert
(Consequences of war. How the battle for Ukraine is changing the world).
ProMedia Vienna 2023; pp. 111-121; ISBN 978-3-85371-511-6.
Olga Baysha was born an ethnic Ukrainian in Kharkiv in 1966 and is a professor of media and communications at the Higher School of Economics in Moscow. Prior to her studies, she worked as an editor at Ukrainian Television (1991-2008).
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