Our army secured peace for Switzerland peace during the Second World War (Part 2)

zf. Part I (Current Concerns No 8 of 25 April 2023) describes the situation of Switzerland at the beginning of the Second World War and various plans of attack and passage as well as German and Allied generals’ assessments of the Swiss army.

Long before Hitler, Germany had been Switzerland’s most important trading partner. Switzerland had already invested 2.7 billion Swiss francs in Germany in the years before 1933. In this context, it is revealing that in 1940, the British government hoped that Switzerland would be prepared to make concessions to Germany, because only in that case Germany might be expected to allow Swiss exports to its British enemy. Thus, the British Foreign Office wrote to its ambassador in Bern on 22 September 1940: “[...] that the apparent readiness of Swiss military circles to resist will not be weakened by any measure on our part [...]. If Switzerland were to make concessions (to Germany), there would be the chance of preventing Switzerland from having to altogether stop supplying war material to Great Britain, at least for a while [...] and thirdly and most importantly: the loss of Switzerland as a centre for information, intelligence gathering and similar activities would entail serious consequences”.

Under pressure from all sides –
the difficult task of securing livelihood

After the fall of France until the arrival of US troops in Geneva on 7 September 1944, i.e., for about 4 years, Switzerland needed import and export permits (“Geleitscheine”) from Germany for its exports and imports and had to make concessions to Germany in return. But for its overseas trade, it also needed permits (“navicerts”) from England.
  From the beginning of the war, England allowed Switzerland to hold supply depots for only two (!) months. In order to enforce this, it accordingly blocked Swiss overseas trade with the help of its powerful fleet. It wanted to prevent Germany from taking over extensive supplies in the event of an occupation of Switzerland. Shortly afterwards, however, the British Prime Minister Churchill warned that Switzerland should not be cut off to such an extent that it would “turn from an unwilling trading partner with Germany into a willing one”.
  Swiss imports from Germany reached 25.3 % of Swiss foreign trade in 1938, 32.4 % in 1941 and 36.5 % in 1944; exports reached 18.5 % in 1938, 39.4 % in 1941 and fell to 25.5 % by 1944. Imports from Great Britain amounted to 6 % of Swiss foreign trade in 1938, exports to 11.2 %. By 1944 they had fallen to 0.1 % and 3 % respectively.
  Thus, on 4 June 1940 – the Swiss borders were not yet completely under German control - the German Sonderstab für Handelskrieg und wirtschaftliche Kampfmassnahmen (Special Staff for Trade War and Economic Combat Measures) wrote in a memorandum for Hitler: “The war equipment consignments from Switzerland to the enemy powers exceed the consignments for Germany many times over. The only effective means of pressure for Germany are the coke and coal supplies.” He added that Switzerland’s dependence on the Western powers was greater than that on Germany because of its imports from overseas.

Ready to fight for their way of life

Immediately after the outbreak of war, the famous US journalist William L. Shirer wrote in his “War Diary” from Berlin: “Switzerland has one tenth of its population under arms, more than any other people in the world. They are ready to fight for their way of life. [...] The Dutch will be easy prey for the Germans. Their army is miserable. (It surrendered only five days after the German attack.) Switzerland will be a tougher nut to crack, and I doubt if the Germans will try.”
  France had been building the Maginot Line since 1930. It was planning to occupy Switzerland in order to get ahead of Germany and Italy. Because of the Swiss army, however, a study of 20 June 1937 came to the conclusion that the rearmament initiated (by Federal Councillor Minger) would “[...] renforcer considérablement la puissance militaire du pays ... sera vraiment une armée moderne sous tous les rapports (considerably strengthen the country’s military power ... will be a truly modern army in every respect)”. Therefore, any operation against Switzerland would be problematic.

The readiness of the civilian population to defend themselves

As part of the total mobilisation, the local und company resistance groups (Orts- und Betriebswehren) were soon created. They were Swiss citizens in their civilian clothes, recognisable by an armband with a Swiss cross, who were not or no longer enlisted in the army and who, with their personal weapons, prepared the defence of their places of residence, mainly against German air landings. Thus, all over the country, mostly on the outskirts of settlements, there were trenches for these local brigades, where their members could immediately take up position shortly after an alarm. There was no radar at that time. So a nationwide network of aerial observation and reporting service was set up, run by volunteer men and women, including young ones not enlisted in the military service. And finally, while still in their teens, the women and men had to do land service with farmers during their summer holidays (the author three times) as part of the battle for cultivation. This was very hard for young city dwellers, but we learned how food is produced.

Time and again: attack plans rejected,
because the Swiss army was too strong

In February 1940, the Allied commander-in-chief, French General Gamelin, submitted his war plans to the government. He first pointed out the German options: an attack on France through Belgium or a frontal attack or “par une manoeuvre d´aile par la Suisse” (flank attack through Switzerland). However, he then ruled out the latter as a possibility for Germany because of our Swiss army, which he considered to be strong.
  In the spring of 1940, Swiss airspace was violated several times by German fighter planes, especially in the Jura. In the air battles that followed, eleven German aircraft were shot down with three Swiss casualties. In addition to a few fatalities among the Swiss pilots, Lieutenant Colonel Homberger, who had been badly hit by bullet wounds to his lungs, back and pelvis, nevertheless managed to make an emergency landing in Biel with his aircraft. His patrol comrade, First lieutenant Kuhn, was attacked by four German Messerschmitt and managed to save himself by a daring flight through the Taubenschlucht, where no German pilot dared to follow him. In the second half of the war, Switzerland was often overflown every night for months by large, low-humming Allied bomber groups. The heavy anti-aircraft guns fired at them in rapid cadence, but did not reach their altitude (yet kept us awake with their crashing noise, as we lay in the straw of the air-raid shelter in the Bürgerliche Waisenhaus (public orphanage) in Bern).
  In the spring of 1940, shortly before the attack on France, Germany hermetically sealed its border with Switzerland along the Rhine and carried out extensive troop movements in the area that could be seen from Switzerland. In this way, it succeeded in creating the impression in our country and in France that an attack on France, carried out from Swiss territory, was imminent. France immediately moved two army corps from the north to the Swiss border and put them on high alert on 13 May 1940. This was exactly what the Wehrmacht wanted. The shift massively weakened the French army in the north, where the Wehrmacht then attacked (Holland, Belgium, Luxembourg, northern France).
  Until the French surrender of 22 June 1940, the Italian general staff considered it possible that Italy could be attacked by France via the Great St. Bernard and the Simplon into the Po Valley. As a preventive measure against this eventuality, it wanted to occupy southern Switzerland.

People and government undoubtedly determined to defend neutrality

In a study of 16 September 1940, the British Joint Chiefs of Staff came to the conclusion that because of the spatial restrictions, the difficult terrain in the Jura, and the recent deployment of the Swiss army, bypassing the Maginot Line through Switzerland was not an option for Germany.
  On 1 September 1942, the German General Staff issued a “Small Orientation Booklet Switzerland” for the “troops in the field”. It states, among other things: “The Swiss militia system permits a complete registration of those eligible for military service at relatively low cost. It preserves the soldierly spirit that has always been strong in the Swiss people and allows the formation of a very strong and appropriately organised war army that is quickly deployable, considering the smallness of the country. The Swiss soldier is characterised by love of his homeland, toughness and reliability. He takes great care of his weapons, equipment, uniforms, horses and pack animals [...]. Yet despite a good period of training, frequent refresher courses and voluntary exercises, the level of training was insufficient at the beginning of the war. The principles of leadership were influenced by German and French ideas [...]. The determination of the government and the people to defend Swiss neutrality against any aggressor is so far beyond doubt”.
  On 7 December 1942, the US magazine Time published an article entitled: “Switzerland: small and tough! Man for man, Switzerland probably has the second-best army in Europe today.” As the US Senate noted in its final report on World War II, the German Wehrmacht was the best from the beginning to the end of the war.
  Germany’s last attack plan against Switzerland was drawn up by the general of the tank forces Franz Böhme in the summer of 1943. There it is stated that, “although it might have been expected that the new military-political situation in Europe would lead to a complete change in Swiss policy in all areas, reports have shown only too clearly that at least in the domestic-political area a certain hardening has occurred. The visible consequence is the Réduit. It is better to fight than to be completely absorbed in the concerns of the new Europe”. The goal of a German attack was defined as follows:
  “Rather, it is precisely the possession of the important north-south connections that is at stake. Only their unrestricted possession [...] together with their power supplies means a clear military victory over Switzerland”.
  “The Swiss army has a great tradition. Its system of defence sets it apart from many others. The utilisation of the people’s strength is a considerable one. If we estimate the strength of the army, we must reckon with about 550,000 men at the end of 1943. [...] Its armament characterises the army as a distinct infantry force. [...] The fortifications in the interior have been increased.” The necessary weapons were actually available and sufficient. Their deployment had been tested.

Decisive and efficient:
German and Allied judgements
about the Swiss army and the Réduit

Böhme then mentions the lack of heavy combat equipment already mentioned in the other attack studies, but then adds: “But the estimate of the Swiss army combat value must not therefore be lowered too unhesitatingly. The fighting will of the Swiss soldier is a high one, and we will have to put it on a par with that of the Finns, for example.” (Who, with a population of about 3 million, withstood the 1939/40 Soviet attack for almost four months). “A nation that has good gymnasts always has good soldiers. The Swiss people’s love of their country is at the highest level imaginable.” Despite the militia system, their shooting training is better than, for example, in the Austrian army, despite the 18-month service period there.
  Then, talking of Switzerland’s lack of war experience: “However, this circumstance is well outweighed by the fact that the Swiss will be fighting in familiar terrain.” Nor should it be forgotten, he says, that the Réduit has brought about a great change. He comes to the following conclusion: “Swiss national defence commands an army that is an extremely formidable factor, if only because of its numerical strength. Defeating those fiercely defending troops in their high alpine Réduit will be a difficult task”.
  On 19 September 1943, things became very critical in Ticino, as Italy was on the verge of surrendering, whereupon the Wehrmacht also took up positions on our border there. 21,000 Italian soldiers and 8,000 Allied prisoners of war fled to Switzerland within days and had to be interned.
  When the Allies got bogged down on the German front in France for two months in the autumn of 1944, they were given an ultimatum by Stalin at the conference in Moscow at the end of October 1944 to attack Germany from France through Switzerland. Churchill and the US representative Harrison immediately refused. But the US General Staff considered the option anyway. On 29 December 1944, it concluded that “the difficulties of the terrain and the acknowledged ability of the small but efficient Swiss forces to fight on their own soil would make such a project doubtful”. So, even the strongest armed force in the world at the time considered the success of an attack on Switzerland doubtful because of our army.
  In the last months of the war, the French 1^st Army under General de Lattre de Tassigny advanced from the Rhone Valley around Switzerland into the Tyrol as part of the Allied formations. Apparently, the French army had chosen this route of attack at the request of General Guisan, a friend of de Lattre, who wanted an end of German troops on the Swiss border as soon as possible. (Actually, the French wanted to advance on Ulm.) General de Lattre later commented: “I was sure of my flank in advance, knowing that the Swiss army, under an excellent leader and driven by patriotic pride, would resist any violation of its soil.”
  In the last year of the war, our national defence included more than 500,000 soldiers, 300,000 auxiliaries (men and women), 530 war planes, 3,000 anti-tank guns and three times more automatic weapons than in 1939.
  To survive in a difficult world, a nation must be committed to intangible values. These include love of country, militancy, coupled with the will to resist aggressors, alongside our fundamental values, such as independence, direct democracy, federalism and love of peace.
  The author leaves it to the reader to decide whether Switzerland’s involvement in the Second World War was prevented by its army or not.   •

Sources:

For his book Hitlers Krieg und die Selbstbehauptung Schweiz 1933–1945 (Hitler’s War and Switzerland’s Self-Assertion 1933–1945), published in 2011, the author conducted extensive research in the Federal Archives, Bern, but also, with the help of their embassies, in archives in the USA, Germany and other countries involved at the time. Thus, he often only received the extensive documents needed for the book on loan. The sources are mentioned in his book.

* After studying Civilisation française, economics and business administration in Paris, Gotthard Frick worked for many years on major infrastructure projects in Switzerland and overseas. 1968–2004 he established and led a consulting, management and training firm with an affiliated English-language university of applied sciences, working worldwide for all development banks, UN organisations (ILO, WTO, UNDP), for the OECD, for various governments and private individuals in over 100 countries on all continents. He held the rank of Infantry battalion commander and has broad military background knowledge thanks to visits to foreign armies (Germany, Pakistan), NATO and US Air Force bases in Germany and Panama.