Transatlantic ‘rules-based international order’ versus postcolonial emancipation

“Up to the middle of the 20^th century, it was still possible to sail from Southampton, London or Liverpool to the other side of the globe without leaving British territory, by berthing off Port Said in Gibraltar and Malta, sailing on from there to Aden, Bombay and Colombo and arriving in Hong Kong after a stopover on the Malay Peninsula … Today, the Chinese can accomplish a very similar feat.”

Peter Frankopan. Licht aus dem Osten (The Silk Roads),
Rowohlt Verlag, Berlin 2016, p. 739

 World conflict

The “collective West” in the form of its transatlantic alliance faces an emerging global political camp of rising powers in Eurasia, Africa and Latin America. Their driving force can certainly be categorised as “emancipatory”. Emancipatory in the sense of “breaking away” from centuries of hegemony by the “North Atlantic world of the white man”¹ and its colonial and neo-colonial dominance. Such powers are primarily China and Russia, as well as regional powers such as Brazil, India, Indonesia, Iran, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia and South Africa.
  Against this backdrop, a new international constellation of forces and conflicts is emerging. The latter applies above all to regions that were and still are considered key regions of international influence, indispensable sources of raw materials and markets for the USA as well as for the West. Under the conditions of multipolarity, however, the rules of the West are beginning to lose their previous monopoly and model function.
  With its strategy of a “rules-based international order”, the West has created a global political doctrine in order to maintain its system of international norms and institutions limited to the USA and its closest allies even under multipolar conditions. Firstly, this system encompasses the previous global economic system created and dominated by the former “Western powers” – the Universal Economic System (UES)² or “rules-based multilateral trading system”³ – on which the global economic regulatory and capital monopoly of the West is based. Secondly, there is the system of instruments for the internationalisation of the Western system of values and order – the collective term for which is human rights – belonging to the EU and NATO states.⁴
  The “rules-based international order” can thus be qualified as a new pact for universal dominance of the West in an emerging multipolar world. Documents from NATO, the EU, parliaments and governments prove that they have integrated the claim to a “rules-based international order” into their programmes and action orientations. It is obvious that the USA is steering this bloc in favour of its claim to global political leadership. They make no secret of this: the US Congress has characterised the content and self-image of this doctrine of the “rules-based international order” as a “world centred around the United States, its allies and partners, to enforce their shared values and interests, to preserve and promote free, open, democratic, inclusive, rules-based, stable and diverse regions.”⁵ There is no question that the USA integrates NATO amongst its “allied partners” into its struggle: “US alliances and partnerships, including NATO, which was created to prevent the Soviet Union (now Russia) from becoming a regional hegemon over Europe” are regarded as bases for “large-scale, long-term US military operations against China and Russia”.⁶
  Against this backdrop, it is clear that the period of American endeavours to control the Eurasian double continent by including Eurasia with the help of NATO’s eastward expansion has begun. In this context, the conflict between the West and Russia over Ukraine as well as that with China can be understood as a trial of strength in the “Era of Great Power Competition” (US Congressional Research Service). This ends a historically short phase of relative détente after the end of the first East-West/West-East conflict in 1990. The confrontation is characterised by its Eurasian enemy constellation spanning three continents (America, EU-Europe, Asia), by the multiple instrumental nature of warfare and conflict resolution, by global economic warfare with consequences for global economic, financial, trade, raw material and market conditions as well as internal social crises.

Causalities

The title’s topic (“rules-based international order”) would not be adequately addressed without considering its second segment “versus post-colonial emancipation – limits and dead ends of a global hegemony project”, as this leads to the causalities, driving forces and contradictions of this global conflict. After all, the more intensively and internationally expansive the West works to monopolarly “domesticate” multipolarity for itself, the more militant intensification of international contradictions could result. And it is precisely in the misjudgement of the new international balance of power that the conceptual and real-political explosive charge of this new world conflict lies.
  The same can be said for regional and continental conflict scenarios and their causalities. Achim Wahl, Karin Kulow and John P. Neelsen, co-authors of a study of the same name as this article, published by the Welttrends Institute for International Politics, make it clear that fundamental changes are currently taking place in the international balance of power, and that these are to the detriment of the transatlantic West, placing its doctrine of a “rules-based international order” on shaky ground. Its instability is caused, firstly, by the fact that the rise of the South is based on qualitative and quantitative changes of an objective nature. The West will not be able to control, dominate or even stop them. It is confronted with the fact that the former “first world” is now finding the breaker of its centuries-long global hegemony in the former “third world”, of all places, which no longer recognises the self-placement of the West as “number one”. This is the new quality that is driving the international dynamic of multipolarity. With the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), influential regional alliances and Euro-Asian centres of gravity have emerged. The member states of the SCO represent around 40 % of the world’s population, of these China’s population alone 12 %.

Voices of reason

Gregor Schöllgen and former German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder assess the situation “in which the West finds itself” as follows: “There is no question that the foundations for a new world order have long been laid. […] While the surviving architects of the old world order, namely North Americans and Western Europeans, have been stuck in its structures for 30 years, others, first and foremost the Chinese, have taken over control and created facts. We may not like these facts, but we have no choice. We have to accept them as elements of an order that has been established without our intervention. If we refuse to do so, we will run aground.”⁷
  It must also be taken into account that the “rules-based international order” with its claim to universal dominance faces the dilemma of the international order’s constitution. In other words, whether it will continue to be US-monopolistic, as it has been since 1990, or multipolar, as it is now and will be in the future. This also touches on the question of hegemony. To the extent that the USA and its allies insist on the universality of their supremacy in the world, they are at the same time resisting the trend of the times, which is pushing towards multipolarisation.
  In contrast to the end of bipolarity between two antagonistic social systems, which determined the international order from the end of the Second World War in 1945 to the end of the Eastern Bloc in 1990 and the collapse of which opened up the historical window of sole hegemony in the world for the USA, the USA and its allies now see themselves challenged not only by the emergence of the post-colonial South together with Russia and China. It is also of fundamental importance that this time they cannot rely on the new powers to go down without a hitch, as the Soviet Union and the socialist camp did in 1990/91. Today, account must be taken of the fact that “new powers” are and will remain the engines and carriers of the multipolarity that is unfolding.

Generalisations …

To generalise, it can be stated:
  One, the new multipolar balance of power is narrowing the West’s scope for international action and its prospects of realising its universalist ambitions. On the contrary, the West is increasingly having to deal with real, obviously dynamically forming opposing forces and their international claims.
  Two, the programme of the “rules-based international” pact doctrine, the conflict potential of anti-Russian and anti-Chinese strategies, the militarisation of international relations and, in particular, a “cold war of values” contrast provocatively with the expectations of the South. The rulers can no longer do as they please, the ruled no longer want to do as they should.
  This also applies to global economic aspects. Instead of opening up to reforms, with steps towards a new world economic, trade, climate and security order, the “rules-based international order” transports acute international contradictions into a still “young” multipolarity and burdens the consolidation of peace policy processes.
  Three, the dangers harboured and carried into contemporary international relations by the pact doctrine of the “rules-based international order” cannot be denied: If multipolarity requires reformed international intentions, rules, behaviours as well as “rules of engagement” between states, then it claims transitional modalities, whether under international law or others. International law should be applicable, based primarily on the Charter of the United Nations, and these relations between states must correspond to the character of peaceful coexistence. The BRICS and SCO states are basing their reform efforts on precisely these international legal regulations.
  Summa summarum: pluralism of systems and pluralism of values are no cause for war. This is one of the most important lessons learnt from the period of peaceful coexistence in Europe after the end of the Second World War, and one that promotes relaxation. It is not systemic differences per se that are a primary cause of threat, but the militarisation of how these are dealt with.
  Our empirical findings lead us to the conclusion that value issues and regime change within interstate and international contradictions are among the most explosive causes of conflict. There were no objective reasons for fuelling them, but subjective Western interests could be identified. Such a policy of “value-led” new (bloc) confrontation leads to wars and catastrophes.

… and conclusions

The following conclusions can be drawn:
  One, EU Europe will not be able to avoid reviewing and redefining its international and foreign policy interests in the already existing, emerging multipolarity. Its continental experience and potential for the civilisation of conflicts, for war prevention and coexistence must be revitalised immediately. As a minimum requirement at a level already achieved once by a German federal government: Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl said in the German Bundestag on 28 November 1990: “We are all called upon now to design a new architecture for the European house, for a lasting and just peace order on our continent.”⁸ Under the new multipolar conditions, it made no sense, after the Cold War, which was successfully overcome in 1990 by peace policy means, to burden multipolarity in its peace policy perspective with renewed transatlantic hegemonic confrontations, loss of trust, crises and wars. Egon Bahr’s prophetic question whether Europe wanted self-determination, which he once (after 1990) asked in the face of a new world, remains on the agenda unchanged and unanswered: “Self-determination can only be achieved vis-à-vis the protectorate power. More precisely: by ending America’s far-reaching dominance over European foreign and security policy.”⁹
  Two, peace with so-called “non-democratic” states is a prerequisite for peace under multipolar conditions. Tolerance towards processes of cultural and religious plurality, self-determination and national identity would open up enormous international capabilities for détente. Provocative battle slogans such as “democracy versus autocracy” should be removed from international relations between states. With regard to the significance and place of the problem of values in European/Eurasian state relations, an approach should be developed that realistically assesses contemporary multipolar and socio-culturally pluralistic conditions. Priority should be given to co-operative state relations.
  Three, principles of peaceful coexistence in Europe, the Helsinki Final Act and the principles of “Bandung”¹⁰ in Africa and Asia should regain central, practical significance. The signatory states should recommit themselves to upholding and modernising their principles and basic rules. In Europe, the goal of a European peace order that includes the Russian Federation must not be dropped as “obsolete”, as Russia remains Europe’s largest country.
  Four, Europe’s unique Eurasian continental position must be developed with foresight for the mutual benefit. In terms of perspective, this is of central importance, as no one else can enjoy the continental neighbourhood of three centres of the new multipolar world structure as China, Europe and Russia can. A relationship of peaceful coexistence and cooperation could together make them the global economic centre of gravity.  •

¹ Crome, Erhard. Deutschland auf Machtwegen (Germany on the road to power), VSA: Verlag Hamburg, 2019, p. 168
² Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, Occasional Paper, April 2019; https://static.rusi.org/201905_op_which_rules_why_there_is_no_single_rules_based_international_system_web.pdf
³ Term used at G20 summits
⁴ In April 2021, the EU decided that it “is key to mainstream human rights into all the EU’s activities and policies”.
⁵ The United States global leadership role, Congressional Bills 117^th Congress 2021/2022, [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office], [p. 1169 Reported in Senate (RS)], STATEMENT OF POLICY, BILLS-117hr3524ih.pdf (congress.gov) (1), (italics A.S.)
⁶ U.S. Role in the World: Background and Issues for Congress, p. 4, Updated 19 January 2021, Congressional Research Service, https://crsreports.congress.gov, https://sgp.fas.org/crs/row/R44891.pdf. (italics A.S.)
⁷ Schöllgen, Gregor; Schröder, Gerhard. Letzte Chance. Warum wir jetzt eine neue Weltordnung brauchen (Last chance. Why we need a new world order now), Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt 2021, p. 218
⁸ Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl: address to the German Bundestag on 28 November 1990
⁹ Bahr, Egon. Der deutsche Weg (The German Way), Karl Blessing Verlag, Munich 2003, p. 103
¹⁰ At the Bandung Conference (Indonesia) from 17 to 24 April 1955, delegates from 29 African and Asian states met to express their desire for independence and non-alignment. The newly independent states in Asia wanted to support the still dependent peoples in the Third World in their struggle for emancipation, and they reaffirmed their desire for co-operation and resistance against colonialism. They demanded, among other things, equality for the peoples of Africa and Asia, decolonisation, peaceful coexistence and economic development, non-interference in internal affairs. https://www.cvce.eu/de/education/unit-content/-/unit/02bb76df-d066-4c08-a58a-d4686a3e68ff/672bad6e-07d9-4d0d-b921-4a932321017f

* Doctor and honorary Doctor Arne Clemens Seifert (born 1937 in Berlin), former ambassador, Senior Research Fellow, WeltTrends Institute for International Politics, Potsdam. Studied at the Institute of International Relations, Moscow, specialising in Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, graduated in 1963. Doctorate at the Institut für Internationale Arbeiterbewegung (Institute for International Labour Movement), Berlin, 1977. Honorary Doctor at the Orient Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences 2017. Positions in the Foreign Ministry of the GDR 1964–1990: Arab States Division, worked on the ground in Egypt, Jordan; Sector Head Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan; Research Assistant to the Deputy Minister for Asia, Africa; Ambassador to the State of Kuwait 1982–1987; Head of Department 1987–1990. After 1990: OSCE Mission to Tajikistan; Central Asia Advisor at the Centre for OSCE Research (CORE), Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg, specialising in OSCE and Central Asia research – Civil Conflict Prevention, Transformation, Transformation and Development. Civil conflict prevention, transformation, political Islam, secular-Islamic relations, political processes. Recent publications include: Dialogue and Transformation – 25 Years of OSCE and Central Asia Research, Nomos; Islamic Awakening in Central Asia – Specifics of Religious Radicalisation Prevention, OSCE Yearbook Vol. 24, 2018; Peaceful Coexistence in Our Time – The New Cold War and the Question of Peace, WeltTrends, 2021.