Neutrality is the cornerstone of our state

From the debate on the neutrality initiative within the Council of States, on 19 June 2025

by Dr iur. Marianne Wüthrich

It is remarkable what a lively discussion the neutrality initiative has sparked in the Council of States. Around half of the council members present spoke, which in itself shows the special significance that neutrality has for us Swiss. It is good that the neutrality initiative is stimulating discussion and reflection on this core Swiss issue in parliament and among the population.

Not a single speaker questions neutrality itself. Some outstanding statements are also encouraging. Unfortunately, however, the lack of serious history teaching in our schools and the departure from a neutral foreign policy over decades have also left their mark. One speaker claimed, for example, that every member of the Council of States had a different concept of neutrality, and that these 46 ideas were also reflected in the population. Another picked up on the absurd idea that the initiative was contrary to the UN Charter.1 The initiative counters such wild speculation: neutrality, and thus Switzerland’s understanding of itself as a state, is based on a historically grown foundation of values that must not be left to arbitrariness.

Counterproposal does
not answer the key questions

In the vote, a majority in the Council of States agreed with the initiators in that they want to enshrine neutrality as a principle in the constitution. However, this is only in the form of a significantly watered-down counterproposal – but at least it is something. The author of the proposal, Benedikt Würth (of party Die Mitte SG), states: “Switzerland’s neutrality is not only a valuable asset for us, but also an important element for the international community, especially at a time when we are seeing the formation of blocs.” That is why the minority of the Foreign Affairs Committee is “convinced that this central principle of statehood has constitutional status.” The catch with the counterproposal is that its authors want to give the Federal Council as much freedom as possible in its foreign policy: “We do not recommend rejecting it [the initiative] because we reject neutrality, but because we reject the initiative’s attempt to handcuff the Federal Council. These are paragraphs 2 and 3 of the initiative.” (Pirmin Bischof, Die Mitte SO). The “handcuffs” refer to the ban on participation in military alliances and non-military sanctions against warring states, according to the text of the initiative.
  Then there are the tacticians who, basically, don’t have much to do with neutrality, but who calculate that a counterproposal will improve the chances of the initiative being rejected in the referendum. One such tactician is Thierry Burkart (party FDP AG), who describes himself as a transatlanticist and even fears that the counterproposal will make it more difficult to achieve his goal of integrating our country into NATO, but nevertheless agrees to it, willy-nilly: “From a political point of view, I naturally see the advantage that a counter-proposal to the popular initiative would avoid the enshrinement of neutrality in the constitution being contrasted with the option of doing nothing, so to speak. In contrast, the counter-proposal would contrast one variant of neutrality with another variant of neutrality […]”.
  Jakob Stark (party SVP TG) brings the discussion back to the Swiss understanding of neutrality: “On 28 February 2022, the Bloomberg news agency ran a headline saying that the Swiss had abandoned their historic neutrality in order to implement sanctions against Russia; and the ‘New York Times’, for example, stated that Switzerland was thus setting aside its long tradition of neutrality.” By adopting these sanctions, “Switzerland has completely relinquished its authority to interpret and define neutrality,” according to Stark. He states: “We have no choice but to agree on a definition of the Federal Constitution that is applicable today. Otherwise, our neutrality and foreign policy will remain ineffective.” However, the counterproposal does not answer the central questions: “It is actually heading in the right direction, and I will eventually support it, but the counterproposal also sidesteps the essential questions that concern us, namely the question of participation in a military alliance and the question of sanctions. These are actually the two questions we need to answer.”

‘Switzerland is neutral.
Its neutrality is perpetual and armed’

It is balm for the heart and mind that a number of members of the Council of States not only want to enshrine perpetual armed neutrality in the constitution, but also point out that it must be lived.
  In this sense, Heidi Z’graggen (Die Mitte UR) states: “Switzerland’s neutrality is perpetual and armed. One is inconceivable without the other. Perpetual means not only the period since 1848 and beyond, perpetual means that neutrality applies not only in times of war, but also in times of peace. This is known as the ‘pre-effect’. The preliminary effect requires restraint in foreign policy, such as refraining from joining military alliances or exporting weapons to conflict regions, as has been the practice since the 1970s with the War Material Act. In a changing world – and, incidentally, it is a constant in the world that everything changes – Switzerland must maintain a balance between sovereign independence and the ability to act in foreign policy, between adherence to principles and pragmatic realism. No one is saying that it is easy to find the right balance here. But I believe that in recent years, the pendulum has swung too far in the direction of alliance, almost to the point of de facto NATO membership. The pre-emptive effect of perpetual neutrality has been diluted. Simply continuing as before therefore jeopardises Switzerland’s credibility.”
  Beat Rieder (Die Mitte VS) believes it is necessary to enshrine neutrality as a principle in the constitution in order to commit the Federal Council and Parliament to perpetual neutrality: “There is a real danger and possibility that the Federal Council and Parliament could lose their balance here and abandon the principle of neutrality in favour of one party in the event of war. This would irrevocably destroy the principle of neutrality.” On the other hand, enshrining the principle of neutrality in the constitution would restrict the parliament and the Federal Council in their foreign policy actions, according to Rieder, which would not suit everyone: “I cannot help feeling that certain circles are so strongly opposed to the principle of neutrality in the Federal Constitution because they want to reserve for themselves the leeway to abandon neutrality in specific situations. […] That is precisely not neutrality. Because neutrality is permanent, in all conflicts, and it is armed. That means it needs its own army.”

Neutrality is a pillar of our identity

The same Council members recall the historical development of Swiss neutrality. In 1848, it was not necessary to enshrine neutrality as a specific article in the Federal Constitution, according to Beat Rieder: “At that time, there was no need for a corresponding constitutional provision among the population and in Parliament. People knew what had to be done. […] At that time, however, there was no question of Switzerland forming closer ties with other confederations in order to secure its independence. War was omnipresent in Europe, and so neutrality was very much understood as a means of securing Switzerland’s independence and peace. It was understood to mean that Switzerland would not allow itself to be drawn into armed conflicts with other states, regardless of which conflict was raging in Europe at the time.”
  And Heidi Z’graggen: “Neutrality is the cornerstone of the Swiss state, and has been for generations, since the Tagsatzung of 1674 and then especially since the founding of the federal state in 1848. It is a fundamental element of the Swiss identity, enshrined in the constitution. However, its form has remained changeable. […] Neutrality has proven its worth. It has ensured freedom of action, the preservation of independence and peace on our own soil. With a clear compass: Switzerland does not allow itself to be drawn into armed conflicts, does not participate in wars and opposes war as a means of conflict resolution.
  Neutrality has shaped our state for generations and guided it safely through the storms of Europe’s turbulent, eventful and difficult history. It is more than a foreign policy instrument; it is a political foundation, stabilising internally, clear externally, a pillar of our identity, perhaps even its clearest expression.”
  If only the Federal Assembly had elected Heidi Z’graggen as Federal Councillor in 2019 – instead of Viola Amherd!

‘The ethical foundation
of neutrality is peace’

Paragraph 4 of the neutrality initiative, which aims to enshrine Switzerland’s peace policy in the constitution, was not contested in the debate and is to be incorporated into the counterproposal. Nevertheless, two members of the Council of States emphasised the central importance of neutrality for a credible peace policy: “The ethical foundation of neutrality is peace – and in my view, peace is something that we should preserve as one of the highest maxims in this world at all times. And this ethical foundation is so central and important because in the event of war or conflict, it is not personal morality that counts, but always peace. As a neutral country, Switzerland can contribute a great deal to this.” (Esther Friedli, SVP SG)
  “A neutral Switzerland is also committed – and this is very important – to humanitarian, diplomatic and economic issues. In doing so, it is always impartial; not to please one side or the other, but on the basis of our laws, our values and international law. Neutrality requires prudent action; it is, in fact, the art of high impartial statecraft. Perpetual armed neutrality, combined with a clear commitment to peace, belongs in the constitution. Now is the time to enshrine it in law – as a guiding principle for a free, secure and reliable Switzerland. The principle of ‘internal security, external peace promotion’ has shaped our country for generations. It is more than a tradition; it is a promise for the future.” (Heidi Z’graggen) •



1 The construct devised by NATO hardliners states that a state’s right to self-defence entails an obligation on Switzerland to cooperate militarily with NATO/the EU or to impose unilateral sanctions against a warring party.

Source: Minutes of the Council of States meeting on 19 June 2025; https://www.parlament.ch/de/ratsbetrieb/amtliches-bulletin/amtliches-bulletin-die-verhandlungen?SubjectId=68533#votum17

“Neutrality is not a changeable instrument that can be adapted as required”

(Daniel Jositsch, SP ZH)

mw. In the Council of States, Social Democrat Daniel Jositsch also describes in impressive terms what Switzerland’s neutrality is all about. We reproduce part of his speech. Incidentally, Daniel Jositsch would also have liked to become a member of the Federal Council – a pity he has not yet had this opportunity. 

“You know my position. I can summarise it in two points. On the first point: you can only be neutral in war. In peacetime, neutrality is an empty phrase.”
  A former member of the National Council asked him: “How can you still be neutral in a war like the one between Russia and Ukraine?” Jositsch’s answer: “If you are not neutral in a war, when are you neutral?” 
  “On the second point: neutrality is primarily determined by what others, especially those who are at war, think of us. If they think we are not neutral, then we have a problem with our neutrality, because then it is not perceived as such by the outside world.”
  “The Federal Council interprets neutrality as a changeable instrument that needs to be adapted a little. I think we need to give the Federal Council a clear line on this. Neutrality is not a changeable instrument that can be adapted as required. I have to tell you quite honestly: in my opinion, we are violating neutrality by exporting war material – we had this discussion last week and I said so at the time. If we support sanctions that are not global and approved by the UN, I believe we are violating neutrality because we are taking a stand. Today, both are instruments with which you support a belligerent party.”
  “If we have a clear text, we have a line. [...] Acceptance [of the neutrality initiative, mw] means that we may not actively participate in a war, we may not participate in a defence alliance, i.e., NATO, and we may not participate in sanctions outside of those of the UN. At least then we have a clear line, and I believe that the Federal Council needs this line. I don’t need the Federal Council to interpret what neutrality means depending on the situation.
  If we agree to the counter-proposal, and I will also agree to this, then we will have a little less precision, we will have a little more room for manoeuvre. In terms of a compromise, I can certainly live with that. What is important for me, with the counter-proposal and the initiative, is firstly the clear line for the Federal Council. Secondly, I believe that we must have a constitutional provision on this so that it is also visible to the outside world.”
  “It’s quite clear: if you had gone to Ukraine in peacetime, in 2020, and said that we are neutral, by the way, the Ukrainians would have said: great, we think that’s great, neutral people are great. Since the war, the Ukrainians no longer think it’s great that Switzerland is neutral, because that means it doesn’t support them. Yes, that’s logical, it means that if our neutrality is not understood, it means that we are actually living it. Being neutral is unpleasant. When I’m in a conflict, I don’t want the others to be neutral; I want them to be on my side. Their neutrality does me no good. So, if we are not understood, we are obviously living neutrality properly. And that’s why I believe we need to have a clear constitutional provision.”
  Daniel Jositsch explains why the narrow majority of the Foreign Affairs Committee does not want a constitutional provision on neutrality: “They are opposed to it because they want to have this possibility of interpretation, to still be able to turn a corner and say: We are now still participating in appropriate sanctions. It would like to have this option and not be forced into this corset of neutrality.
  In other words, the majority [of the FAC-S, mw] would like to march through the world with neutrality on their banner in times of peace, and when neutrality really matters – namely in the event of a conflict – they want to keep all options open. But that’s not how neutrality works. It’s too easy, it’s too convenient. It doesn’t mean being neutral.”

Our website uses cookies so that we can continually improve the page and provide you with an optimized visitor experience. If you continue reading this website, you agree to the use of cookies. Further information regarding cookies can be found in the data protection note.

If you want to prevent the setting of cookies (for example, Google Analytics), you can set this up by using this browser add-on.​​​​​​​

OK