How can peace ethics succeed?

Switzerland remained permanently neutral throughout the Cold War (1949 to 1991). In doing so, it helped to initiate a process of reconciliation in many conflicts. Switzerland served not only its own country but also Europe and the world in terms of peace policy. At that time, Switzerland was a diplomatic great power.
  Since the end of the Cold War, however, Switzerland’s neutrality has begun to erode. During the First Gulf War in 1991, Switzerland adopted the UN’s economic sanctions against Iraq, even though it was not yet a member of the UN at the time. In doing so, it returned to what it called “differential” neutrality, meaning it was willing to make concessions on its neutrality. As is well known, the economic sanctions against Iraq had devastating effects on the civilian population, especially on children. According to UN organisations such as UNICEF and the WHO, and especially according to the reports of Hans-Christof von Sponeck, the former coordinator of the UN’s humanitarian aid program for Iraq, more than one million people died, including more than 500,000 children under the age of five. The reasons were shortages of food and medical aid such as medicines. Switzerland bears part of the responsibility here because it supported the sanctions. That had nothing to do with neutrality anymore.
  The erosion of neutrality continued throughout the 1990s, until it was virtually destroyed with the adoption of EU sanctions packages against Russia in March 2022 in the context of the war in Ukraine. This death blow to neutrality was the reason why a cross-party working group launched a popular initiative to safeguard Swiss neutrality. It was submitted in Bern on 11 April 2024, with just under 130,000 valid signatures. The Swiss government, the Federal Council, rejects this initiative and states in its message that it wants to continue to handle neutrality “flexibly”. The parliamentary process is now underway. But even if the government and parliament, and even all the parties, reject the initiative, it will still be put to a vote next year. That is democracy in action in Switzerland: the people have the final say!
  The referendum campaign has been underway since 11 April 2024 and has sparked lively debates in Switzerland. Every initiative has a so-called “pre-effect”. This means that the submission of an initiative ensures that politicians, the media and the population address the issue and that a more or less factual discussion takes place. This is at the heart of Swiss political culture. I myself am a grammar school teacher and a historian and a member of the committee for the neutrality initiative.
  For some time now, I have been working on historical examples from Swiss history that clearly illustrate the role and significance of Swiss neutrality. These examples show how important perpetual neutrality has been for Switzerland, Europe and the world, and why it must now be more firmly anchored in the constitution through the initiative. In this context, I also came across the anniversary of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), which celebrated its 50^th anniversary on 1 August 2025. This process exemplifies the great value of Swiss neutrality.

Background of the CSCE

The initiative to convene a European security conference was launched in 1969 by the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact countries. The policy of détente between East and West had already taken shape: there was a direct channel of communication between Moscow and Washington, and disarmament negotiations were also taking place. East and West sought to improve the situation on the European continent and considered creating a “security architecture” for Europe. The European Community (EC, now the EU), NATO, the neutral and non-aligned states, but also the Eastern Bloc had partly divergent demands in this regard. However, this did not prevent the states from beginning mutual consultations. Switzerland also participated actively in these consultations.
  In 1970, a working group from the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs drafted a report setting out Switzerland’s interests. Building on its traditional role as a mediator in conflicts between states, Swiss diplomacy launched a proposal to establish a system for the peaceful settlement of disputes. The focus was to be on “promoting interpersonal relations between East and West”. The report also called for “the right to neutrality to be enshrined in the conference”.¹ In addition, Geneva was offered as a possible venue for the negotiations as part of its “Good Offices”.
  Two years of mutual soundings and talks across Europe followed. Switzerland exchanged ideas most intensively with the other neutral countries but also found the exchange of ideas with the countries of Eastern Europe surprisingly fruitful. The main negotiations then took place in Geneva from September 1973, as proposed by Switzerland. Thirty-five countries took part: the seven Warsaw Pact countries, the 15 NATO countries and 13 neutral countries. The neutral or non-aligned countries were: Switzerland, Austria, Sweden, Finland, Yugoslavia, Cyprus, Malta, San Marino, Liechtenstein, Ireland, Iceland, Monaco and the Holy See.
  Four thematic areas, known as “baskets”, were defined. The first basket concerned the catalogue of principles on fundamental issues of sovereignty and inter-state relations, security policy considerations in the narrower sense, and confidence-building measures in the military sphere. The second basket was devoted to cooperation between East and West in the fields of economics, science, technology and the environment. Basket three was to address “human contacts” between East and West, as proposed by Switzerland. Finally, the fourth basket dealt with defining the further working process of the CSCE.

The role of Switzerland

It should be noted that neutral Switzerland continued to play an important role with its quiet behind-the-scenes diplomacy. Together with the other neutral countries Austria, Sweden and Finland, it provided important mediation services, thereby strengthening the entire process. From 1974 onwards, it also did so in association with non-aligned Yugoslavia and the small states of Cyprus, Malta, San Marino and Liechtenstein as the “N+N Group”, the “Neutrals and Non-Aligned”. There was no fundamental willingness to compromise on the part of the two superpowers, the Soviet Union and the USA. In his final report on the CSCE process, the head of the Swiss delegation, Rudolf Bindschedler, refers to the “rigidity of the great powers”.² In his report, he also repeatedly mentions the “double game”, i.e., the gap between the public statements of governments, especially those of the great powers, and the position of the delegations in Geneva. However, when the discussions reached such an impasse that neither side could make or accept concessions without losing face, proposals were put forward through the neutral countries. At such key moments, Swiss diplomats helped to break the deadlock in the negotiations and ultimately achieve a result that was acceptable to all states. This meant that the superpowers could repeatedly be persuaded to compromise on a temporary basis.
  In his final report, Bindschedler discusses the role of the neutral countries throughout the process in detail and assesses their influence as very high: “The extent of common interests [i.e. of the neutral and non-aligned countries, author’s note] proved to be much greater than could initially have been assumed. Cooperation within this group was close and trusting. Their unified stance forced the blocs to show consideration and facilitated the implementation of numerous postulates. […] For the neutral and non-aligned countries, their mutual trust is probably one of the most important outcomes of the conference.”³

Final Act in Helsinki

After two years of negotiations, which took place in Geneva from 18 September 1973 to 21 July 1975, the delegates of 35 states signed the CSCE Final Act in Helsinki on 1 August 1975.⁴ The document is divided into four sections. The first section deals with “Questions relating to Security in Europe” and is structured around a declaration of ten guiding principles:

1. Sovereign equality, respect for the rights inherent in sovereignty
2. Refraining from the threat or use of force
3. Inviolability of frontiers
4. Territorial integrity of states
5. Peaceful settlement of disputes
6. Non-interference in internal affairs
7. Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion and belief
8. Equal rights and self-determination of peoples
9. Cooperation between states
10. Fulfilment in good faith of obligations under international law

Bindschedler’s assessment of the ten guiding principles is very insightful: “The Final Act contains numerous positive rules of conduct for the future that are worthy of praise.”⁵ He cited the ten guiding principles in particular: “Admittedly, the ten principles on mutual relations between states largely reiterate existing international law, as set out primarily in the UN Charter.”⁶ However, the catalogue of principles further develops and completes important fundamental principles, he continued: “The first principle expressly emphasises the right of states to belong or not to belong to international organisations, to be members of an alliance or not, and the right to neutrality.”⁷ This meant that an important demand made by Switzerland had been included in the final document. Imagine if the countries aligned with the blocs had exercised this right!
  The second section of the Final Act deals with cooperation in the fields of economics, science, technology and the environment, section three deals with issues of security and cooperation in the Mediterranean region, and section four finally deals with principles of cooperation in humanitarian and cultural fields. In his final report, Bindschedler emphasises the importance of the neutral countries in this area in particular: “The results […] in the areas of human contacts, travel, family reunification and information are largely attributable to the activities of the neutral countries.”⁸ According to Bindschedler, “political and psychological considerations”⁹ played a major role in this. This example in particular clearly demonstrates the political and moral superiority of the neutral position. However, Bindschedler also recognises the shortcomings of the Final Act. It is not an international treaty: “This is regrettable, because only on the basis of law does a lasting and stable settlement appear possible. […] Thus, the Final Act is merely a political declaration, a declaration of intent. As such, it can have a psychological and political impact. However, its value can only be assessed in the future.”¹⁰
  With regard to the 10^th guiding principle, Bindschedler emphasises in particular “the fulfilment of obligations under international law in good faith.” These are essentially central principles of peace ethics in politics and, according to Bindschedler, “rules of conduct for the future that should be positively acknowledged.”¹1 This important provision was also established under the decisive leadership of the neutral countries.
  In summary, Bindschedler notes: “On the other hand, the conference can be a starting point for further political development and contribute to improving the climate among states and reducing existing tensions.”¹²
  And specifically for neutral countries: “The conference and the final act have strengthened the position of small states and neutral countries. They have become a factor that must be reckoned with, not militarily, but politically. The task for the future is to maintain this position.”¹³ According to Bindschedler, this position should be used in particular for “peaceful dispute resolution”. Finally, he describes the role of neutral Switzerland as a major diplomatic power: “In general, the conference has led to an increase in Switzerland’s influence, role and importance. Swiss proposals were successfully implemented on numerous individual points. […] Together with the other neutral countries, Switzerland acted as a mediator and contributed significantly to achieving solutions that were satisfactory to all sides.”¹⁴ According to Bindschedler, this work must be continued: “Inaction would be most damaging; here, too, the rule applies that we must be pessimists in our assessment, but optimists in our actions.”¹⁵
  On 1 August 1975, Swiss President Pierre Graber signed the CSCE Final Act on behalf of Switzerland. In his address to the assembled delegates, Graber spoke of neutral Switzerland’s special commitment to the success of the conference: “Switzerland, located at the crossroads of three cultural spheres that have contributed greatly to the global influence of the old continent, has always been attuned to the life of Europe. Throughout its 700-year history, it has shared its highs and lows. As I explained two years ago, here in the same place, my country’s neutrality has never been an excuse for a policy of ‘empty chairs’, for indifference and withdrawal into itself. On the contrary, it has awakened in it the need for solidarity and the will to serve the international community at all times and in accordance with its means.”¹⁶ Graber continues in his powerful speech: “Good relations throughout Europe are and remain our constant desire. The fact that we have not joined any alliances or coalitions was therefore deeply in line with a vocation that is European in the broadest sense. We are therefore pleased that the option of neutrality has been included in the chapter on principles that should apply in relations between states. Neutrality has thus been recognised as a specific instrument of European security and cooperation.”¹⁷ Graber then explicitly addresses Europe’s responsibility to look beyond the continent and also support developing countries. In other words, he wants to build a security architecture that extends beyond Europe. Just think of the Vietnam War, which also ended in 1975, and its consequences for Southeast Asia. Graber then emphasises the psychological dimension of human relationships. The aim, he says, is “on the one hand to create more complete and secure structures in intra-European relations and, on the other hand, to develop human relations in each of our countries and across borders and make them more harmonious.”18 According to Graber, the documents represent a first step in this direction: “The provisions that we are solemnly adopting here must […] be put into practice tomorrow. […] It requires the unremitting goodwill of all participating states, and it will take the greatest of efforts to achieve this goal. […] Ultimately, these texts will be worth as much as their application.”¹⁹
  The signing of the Final Act by 35 heads of state and government was a strong sign of détente, thanks in particular to neutral Switzerland. The Act is an extraordinary document. It is not a matter of course that, in the midst of the Cold War, representatives of all European states from East and West, including the Soviet Union, the United States and Canada, came together around one table, agreed on common values and committed themselves to adhering to the same rules. Europe was to become safer, and human contacts between East and West were to be expanded. Unfortunately, however, the détente soon ran into crisis.

Conclusion and outlook

Follow-up conferences were to examine the implementation of the CSCE Final Act in the individual states. The CSCE remained a forum for East-West dialogue until the end of the Cold War and played a major, perhaps even decisive, role in overcoming the Cold War. On the one hand, the continuity of the CSCE process contributed to this development, while on the other hand, the USA and the Soviet Union increasingly disregarded the basic principles of the Helsinki Act. In the USA, the Reagan years in the 1980s exacerbated mutual mistrust and fuelled discord with insinuations and deception. Ronald Reagan took advice from neoconservatives and, together with British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, implemented neoliberal policies that fuelled globalisation. With the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, the second superpower once again opted for confrontation and war, thereby exacerbating the East-West conflict. The important principle of the CSCE Final Act, namely the “fulfilment in good faith of obligations under international law”, was broken and much trust was squandered once again.
  The end of the Cold War was celebrated in 1990 at a special CSCE summit in Paris. But the Charter of Paris, with its title “A New Era of Democracy, Peace and Unity”, could not hide the new divisions. The USA, as the sole world power, even spoke of an “end of history”. As we know today, that was a simple lie. As early as 1991, the USA staged the First Gulf War and has been waging war ever since. As already mentioned, Switzerland’s adoption of economic sanctions marked the beginning of the process of dismantling its neutrality.
  Although the global political situation was precarious, it was decided at the CSCE summit in Budapest on 5 and 6 December 1994 to transform the CSCE into an organisation. It was continued on 1 January 1995 as the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and is now a permanent conference with its headquarters in Vienna. The destruction of Yugoslavia during the 1990s marked the beginning of the decline of the already weakened OSCE. It is now completely irrelevant.
  Switzerland will assume the chairmanship of the OSCE next year (as it did in 1996 and 2014). With its 57 participating states and permanent institutions such as the Ministerial Council and the Parliamentary Assembly, the OSCE is still the world’s largest regional organisation for cooperative security. It spans the northern hemisphere and could regain its influence through cooperation with, for example, BRICS and other organisations of the countries of the South. These organisations could serve as models for inter-state coexistence in a multipolar world. Switzerland would therefore have a very important task next year as chair of the OSCE and the opportunity to strengthen the OSCE again in line with the CSCE Final Act. It should urgently call again for mutual respect between countries, the renunciation of violence, the resolution of conflicts exclusively by diplomatic means, the renunciation of border changes and cooperation for the benefit of all.
  That, ladies and gentlemen, is why the initiative that will also be put to the vote next year, which aims to enshrine neutrality more clearly in the Swiss Constitution, is so important. Not only for Switzerland, but also for Europe and the world. This could also strengthen the OSCE, bearing in mind the importance that neutral countries had for the CSCE process. Perhaps, as Bindschedler said, I am a pessimist in terms of my view of the world situation, but I am also an optimist in terms of my actions. With this in mind, the Swiss population must be encouraged to support the neutrality initiative. A great deal of work still lies ahead of us. Let’s get to work! •

¹ Die Schweiz und die Europäische Sicherheitskonferenz, EPD, (Switzerland and the European Security Conference, EPD), 7 July 1970, cited in: dodis.ch/34490
² Bindschedler, Rudolf. Konferenz über Sicherheit und Zusammenarbeit in Europa. Beobachtungen und Bemerkungen (Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Observations and comments), 29 August 1975, cited in: dodis.ch/38870
³ ibid.
⁴ Final Act of the Helsinki Conference (CSCE), cited in: dodis.ch/58821
⁵ Bindschedler, Rudolf. Konferenz über Sicherheit und Zusammenarbeit in Europa. Beobachtungen und Bemerkungen (Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Observations and comments), 29 August 1975, cited in: dodis.ch/38870
^6-15  ibid
¹⁶ Ansprache von Herrn Bundespräsident Pierre Graber, Vorsteher des Eidgenössischen Politischen Departements (Address by Federal President Pierre Graber, Head of the Federal Department of Political Affairs), Helsinki, 30 July 1975, cited in: dodis.ch/38867
^17-19 ibid

* René Roca (PhD) is a Swiss historian and a high school teacher. He founded and directs the Research Institute for Direct Democracy (www.fidd.ch). He is a member of the committee of the Neutrality Initiative (https://neutralitaet-ja.ch/).