Asia – a model for a multipolar, multilateral, and multicivilizational world

Pascal Lottaz: Asia has transformed massively in just one century – from a region carved up by colonial empires to the powerhouse of today’s emerging multipolar world. The SCO [Shanghai Cooperation Organisation], ASEAN… so many of the key pillars of the new global order are now anchored right here in Asia. To discuss the continent’s stunning success and its future, I am joined today by the prolific Singaporean diplomat and academic, Dr. Kishore Mahbubani, the author of “Has China Won?”, “The Asian 21^st Century” and “Living the Asian Century”. Ambassador Mahbubani, do you share my assessment that Asia is really going to be one of the centres of this new multipolar world?
Kishore Mahbubani: No, Asia is not going to become only a centre. It is going to become the centre. And of course, there will be multiple poles within Asia. Asia itself will be multipolar, not just part of a multipolar world. The key point which I emphasise in my writings is that the 200 years of Western domination of world history have been an aberration. Because from the year one to the year 1820, the two largest economies in the world were always China and India. It is only in the last 200 years that Europe and North America took off.
  But this Western domination was always an aberration. It has come to an end, and it is ending very fast. And I always give one statistic to illustrate this. If you compare the combined economy of the European Union with China, in the year 2000 the EU’s economy was eight times bigger than China’s. Today, they are about the same size. And by 2050, Europe will be half the size of China.
  The Europeans have got to understand that when you go from being eight times bigger than China to becoming half the size of China in 50 years, you have to learn to treat China with more respect, instead of making this sort of condescending comments that European leaders still make about China – this is just insane.

Yes, it is. Somehow this will just not leave the European mindset – they still believe everything revolves around them. But now reality is catching up very fast. One of our colleagues, Glenn Diesen, proffered this argument in a book: that Europe needs to get back to the idea that it is really just the western peninsula of Eurasia. Do you think this kind of reintegration of Europe into Asia will have to become a reality sooner or later?
Certainly. I think it is important for Europeans to understand that if you look objectively at the world today, Europe represents the past -– a beautiful past, by the way. And so I actually believe that Europe is going to become a fine museum for the world, in some ways. The United States of America represents the present, but Asia represents the future. That is where all the future growth is going to come from. It will be better for Europeans to adapt to this change in advance rather than to resist it. And acceptance definitely means that you have to make real concessions – for example, in institutions like the IMF and the World Bank – and not insist that the European voting share must still remain disproportionately high.

What do you think stands in the way of this system changing peacefully? Because right now we are seeing a lot of violence. We see a genocide in Gaza, the war in Ukraine, and the United States preparing to go to war with Venezuela. What makes this moment so violent in your view?
Well, overall, the war in Ukraine is certainly a tragedy, and the Russian invasion of Ukraine is illegal. It should be condemned. But at the same time, it is a war that could have been prevented if the Europeans had shown some degree of geopolitical competence. European geopolitical incompetence is responsible for this war, too, because in the run-up, they completely ignored some of Russia’s real and legitimate security concerns. And certainly, the Gaza war is a tragedy, and a war in Venezuela would also be a tragedy.
  But all things considered, what is stunning if you look at Asia, is that China has managed to enlarge its economy dramatically – as I have just mentioned – so that it is becoming the same size as that of the European Union, despite being only one-eighth its size in the year 2000. China has achieved this rise peacefully. And usually, when great powers emerge, they never do so peacefully. I mean, Graham Allison, in his book “Destined for War” (2014, Houghton Mifflin Harcourt), said that Americans should not wish for China to become like America, because when America emerged as a great power in the 1890s, it was very violent. It declared war on Spain, conquered the Philippines and some of its neighbours. So clearly, China’s peaceful emergence has been a gift to the world. That is what the West should appreciate, and accept the fact that China’s rise has been peaceful, instead of trying to thwart it and thereby create a lot of problems for the world.

From your experience as a diplomat who has had to interact a lot with Europeans and Americans – the West in general – do you think they are able to do that? Do you think they will be able to jump over their own shadow and actually say, “Okay, fine, this time we’re going to try to approach others on an equal footing”? Do you think the West will finally be able to realise that it has to approach others on an equal footing, instead of constantly berating them for all sorts of alleged things?
I would say the more thoughtful people in the West understand that the world has changed, and the West has got to stop talking down, for example, to Asians. But many of the leaders cannot admit this. You remember President Joe Biden’s famous statement that the Chinese have the goal of becoming the number one power in the world, but, as he said, “It ain’t going to happen on my watch.” No American president wants to be president of the United States when it becomes the number two power in the world. So that shows a certain lack of realism, because at some point – I do not know when – the Chinese economy will become the largest in the world. And it is better to prepare for this in advance and to accept it, rather than to keep denying it.
  Earlier, for example, I mentioned the voting shares in the IMF. Even though both the EU and China are about the same size – they each have around 17–18% of the world’s GNP – the EU’s share of IMF voting rights is 27%, and China’s share is 6%. Now, in theory, the voting shares in the IMF are supposed to represent one’s share of global GNP. So the EU will have to cut its voting share from 27% to 17%, and China to increase its share from 6% to 17%. Then you would have voting shares that reflect the world of today, not the world of yesterday. That is a concrete example of how the Europeans are refusing to accept the fact that Asia has risen and that they could adapt and change.

Do you think it would be more realistic to try to nudge the West to actually adapt these institutions, or would it make more sense to just build new ones? Because it seems to me that at the moment, especially within BRICS, the idea is, “Let us build the new infrastructure, and if the West ever wants to join – maybe in the future – they can. But let us go ahead.”
Well, I think that surprisingly, most Asian states are actually happy to live with the current global order that was created by the West in 1945, at the end of World War II. If you look at all the major global institutions – the United Nations, the UN family of institutions like the World Health Organisation, the World Trade Organisation, the IMF, the World Bank, you name it – they were all created by the West at the peak of its power at the end of World War II. Now, in theory, as Asia is rising, Asia could say, “We do not want these Western institutions; we want to create our own.”
  But actually, the Asians want to keep these institutions. Although, of course these institutions have to adapt and accept Asia’s return. For example, you have the UN Security Council within the UN. In theory it has 15 members, but in practice there are five members who control it, the so-called P5: the United States, Russia, China, the UK, and France. The ten elected members are basically observers. The Council is controlled by the P5.
  It is not necessarily a bad thing to have five permanent members with the power of veto. The point is, the great powers of today have to be represented, not the great powers of yesterday. That is what the Security Council was designed to do.
  Let us take the UK, for example. I shall compare the UK to India. The reason I do so is that a hundred years ago, the British were able to rule India effortlessly. It is shocking that about a hundred thousand Englishmen were able to rule over three hundred million Indians – amazing, right?
  Now of course that world will never exist again. But even as recently as in the year 2000, the British economy was three and a half times bigger than the Indian economy. Today, of course, the Indian economy is larger. And by 2050, the Indian economy will be about four times bigger than the British one. When that day comes, it will be absurd to have the UK as a permanent member of the UN Security Council while India is not.
  So, if the British want to be gracious about this, they should say, “Okay, India is now a much more powerful country than we are.” The British should graciously give up their permanent seat on the UN Security Council to India. I think the more thoughtful British realise that the time has come for them to give up their seat on the UN Security Council to India. These are exactly the kind of changes you need to make so you keep the institution of the UN, but modify its composition.

But in order to do that, the British would have to do it voluntarily, and the other four Security Council members would have to accept it, too. The United States might veto it. France might veto it and say, “No, you’re not leaving the club.” Is it realistic to believe that these declining powers are actually capable of saying, “Fine, for the greater good of everybody, we need to disempower ourselves and empower others”? We do not often see things like that in world politics, do we?
Yes, you are right. France could put in a veto, and the United States could put in a veto. You are right. But at the same time, they also have to figure out that the challenge to the UN Security Council – the danger for the UN Security Council – is that they may keep their present composition but lose their credibility. No one will listen to them. People will say, “Who are you? Who do you represent? Why should you British still be on the Council?” So, to keep its credibility, the Council has got to change its composition. That is the dilemma the current members of the P5 have: do they keep the composition and lose their credibility, or change the composition and keep their credibility?
  In my book “The Great Convergence” I have suggested a comprehensive formula for reforming the UN Security Council. I call it the 7-7-7 formula. According to this, you would have seven permanent members in the UN Security Council. Those seven would of course be the United States, Russia, China, the European Union with one combined seat, and then, as the new members, India, Brazil, and either South Africa or Nigeria from Africa. So, seven permanent members. Then you would have seven semi-permanent members, because for every new member that wants to come in, there is always a neighbour who says, “Why not me?” If Brazil wants to come in, Argentina says, “Why not me?” When India wants to come in, Pakistan says, “Why not me?” So for every member that wants to come in, there is a neighbour who says, “Why not me?” These countries that say, “Why not me?” can become semi-permanent members of the Security Council, rotating every eight years and then coming back in. So, they get something too – they also benefit. And then you have seven elected members. So I believe something along the lines of 7-7-7 can work. In fact, the Quincy Institute in Washington, D.C., is trying to adapt my formula and suggest it as a way of reforming the UN Security Council.

In order for that reform to be passed, you would need to change the UN Charter. And that would have to go through the General Assembly and the Security Council. So would it need just a simple majority in the General Assembly, or more?
I think, probably a two-thirds majority. But if you have a formula that creates a lot of winners, that changes things. You see, right now, the current formulas create losers, not winners, for a lot of countries. But the formula I have suggested creates about 30 to 40 winners. And those winners have a stake in voting for it.

How do you sell it to those who would have to agree to reduce their relative power?
For the smaller states, it is in fact better if they do not have to compete with the middle powers in the UN Security Council. Because if you look carefully at the history of the Council, some of the middle powers – like Brazil, for example – keep coming back every eight or ten years. And then the smaller states have no chance of getting elected. They have to run against the Brazils, the Indias, the Japans, and such like countries. But under my formula, the middle powers are in a separate category. So the smaller states will compete among themselves, and they will have more scope to join in. So there will be more space – and if you look at it carefully – under my formula, there will be more opportunities for smaller states to get elected.

There is no question the UN needs reform. Your formula would be a good idea. The central question is how to do it – how to get it through. And I wonder if ASEAN – I mean, Singapore being part of ASEAN – also has some lessons to offer on how a multipolar world can be structured, where it is not all about top-down decision-making but more of a consensus model. What is your view on this?
Well, I think ASEAN is definitely a role model for the world. Because we have not discussed some of the other changes happening in the world. And I always say that the new world that is coming is what I call a “3M world,”. The 3M means it will be multi-civilizational, multipolar, and multilateral. And the reason the world needs to study ASEAN is that ASEAN is the most successful multi-civilizational association in the world. In fact, no other region is as diverse as Southeast Asia. Indeed, among the roughly 700 million people in Southeast Asia, you have about 250 million Muslims, 150 million Christians, 150 million Buddhists – Mahayana and Hinayana – plus Taoists, Confucianists, Hindus, and even quite a few communists. So this is by far the most diverse region on planet Earth. Yet it has preserved itself as an oasis of peace and prosperity.
  What ASEAN has achieved is to provide a multi-civilizational laboratory for the world, showing how different civilizations can live together in peace. And that is what the 21^st century is going to be all about, because Western civilization has got to learn to live in peace with a stronger Chinese civilization, a stronger Indian civilization, and a stronger Islamic civilization. The reason why only ASEAN can offer a model is that if you look at the European Union, for example, this has been around much longer than ASEAN, but it still remains essentially a Christian club. And, you know, Turkey has been applying to join for about 30 or 40 years now. The fact that the European Union cannot admit even one Islamic member shows that it is not psychologically preparing itself for a multi-civilizational world. But ASEAN is teaching the world how to live in a multi-civilizational world.

Another thing the West seems unwilling to give up is this habit of thinking in black and white – friend or enemy, ally or adversary. But ASEAN, and Asia in general, does not go along that route. The rest of the world does not move toward forming more and more alliances. How do you actually see the security structure? What can we learn from how Asia has organised its security structure?
Well, one thing you notice is that, relatively speaking, in Asia the major powers are not building alliance structures. China is not building an alliance structure. India is not building an alliance structure. Indonesia is not building an alliance structure. Of course, some Asian states are allies of the West – I mean Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Thailand. But at the same time, they are also pragmatic. Even though they are allies of the United States, they still maintain good relations with China. Although, as you know, right now Japan and China seem to be having a very difficult time. But they have gone through difficult patches before and come out of them, so I hope they will come out of this difficult patch, too.
  But the notion of creating exclusive alliances is not part of the Asian tradition, because we are much more inclusive. We say we had rather have people who are different from us in the same club, because we have to live with people who are different from us, not just those who are similar to us. Under the Western system, you have to be a democracy before you can join a Western alliance, right? But some of the states in ASEAN are democracies, some are not. We say, okay, you choose your political system; we will not pass judgment on it. We accept you for what you are, and we will live with you. And that acceptance of diversity is a big asset for Asia, as opposed to the Western tradition of creating like‑minded alliances.

Do you think the pressure on Southeast Asia and other regions will increase to have more balanced security ties – that is, not to put all their eggs in one basket? Singapore seems to be caught in this field of tension to a particular degree: are we an integral part of the U.S. alliance system or are we not? In my view, the pressure will increase for countries to be more neutral, in the sense of having more partners. How do you see this?
Well, I think certainly in the case of, for example, most Asian countries there is no question. My book “Has China Won?”, which you mentioned, tries to explain why the competition between the U.S. and China will definitely accelerate over the next 10 to 20 years. This is normal, because the world’s number one power will never give up its position gracefully. It will always try to push down the number one emerging power. So the fact that the United States is pushing down China is logical, predictable behaviour for any number one power. We should not be surprised by it. But what is interesting is that, unlike in the case of the Cold War – when the United States was very successful in recruiting allies, both in advanced European countries and also among developing countries – back then, countries like Indonesia, Pakistan, Egypt, and to some extent even China were allies of the United States; and this time, the situation is different.
  This time around, in the contest between the United States and China, almost all the major countries in the world – especially in the Global South – have said, “We are not taking sides. We want to be friends with the United States of America. We want to be friends with China.” And I think that is the pattern. That is the pattern. Certainly, among the eleven ASEAN countries their position has been made very clear: they want to be friends with the United States, they want to be friends with China, and they do not want to take sides. That, in general, also reflects the position of the countries of the Global South.

There is this very telling video of the foreign minister of India, Mr. Jaishankar, in an interview about a year and a half or two years ago. The Western media interviewer really pressed him: when push comes to shove, will you be on the side of the West or with China? Will you be with the West, or will you be with China? It seems not to register in the West that you can have friendly or non‑aligned relationships with several sides. Do you also observe that?
Yes, yes, certainly. And India will emerge as a strong, independent pole in a multipolar world. You know, I have already given you the example of how India’s economy is growing very rapidly compared to the British economy. And in the case of India, it is already the fifth-largest economy in the world, and very soon, within four to five years, it will become the third-largest economy in the world. So clearly, ten years from now, the United States and China will hold the number one and number two positions, and India will be the number three. There is no reason for India to align itself with either the United States or China, because it is big enough and strong enough to be an independent third pole. And frankly, the rest of the world will be happy to see India as an independent third pole, because if that independent third pole does not take sides, it provides political cover for other countries also not to take sides in this US-China contest.

A very concrete question: do you think it is about time we start reforming that very old part of international law, the law of neutrality, to adapt it to this modern idea of being multi‑aligned?
Well, I do not think they will necessarily be neutral. In my view, the word “non‑aligned” is still much more accurate, because on some issues, clearly, countries will work closely with the United States, for example, since the United States is still a leading country in many areas and the world will still have to work with it. And in other areas, they will work closely with China. So that is not necessarily being neutral – they will be non‑aligned and willing to work with anybody.

The interesting thing is that non‑alignment has never been codified in international law, at least not in any way similar to how neutrality was codified. Do you think the UN should work on non‑aligned principles and norms to become more useful?
Well, I think what is more important is for states to show their positions through their behaviour. Behaviour is a much stronger indication. So, for example, the European states – they could have chosen to be an independent pole. In the geopolitical contest between the United States and China, they could have chosen to be friends with the United States and friends with China, right? And that would be a sensible thing for Europe to do, because in many ways, in the long run, the biggest challenge for Europe is not going to come from Russia, right? Russian tanks are not going to invade Germany or France.
  In fact, the biggest challenge to Europe is going to come from the demographic explosion in Africa. In 1950, Europe’s population was double that of Africa’s. Today, Africa’s population is two and a half times bigger than Europe’s, and by 2100, Africa’s population could be ten times bigger than Europe’s. So Europe has a very important vested interest in the economic development of Africa. Every dollar invested in Africa is a gift to Europe, because it creates jobs for Africans to stay in Africa.
  If China is now the biggest investor in Africa – when China invests in Africa, Europe should send China a thank-you note and say, “Thank you for investing in Africa, because you are creating jobs in Africa.” But instead of thanking China for investing in Africa, the Europeans have shown their geopolitical incompetence by slapping China, criticising China for investing there. This is a classic case of shooting yourself in the foot, when you criticise China.
  When I listen to European leaders like Ursula von der Leyen, Kaja Kallas, or Annalena Baerbock, the former foreign minister of Germany, I find that they do not take a step back and make a rational, pragmatic, long-term strategic calculation of what Europe’s interests are in the long run and what Europe should do to protect itself.
  So in some ways, I am actually the best friend Europe has, because I am trying to tell the Europeans: look out for your own interests first. And your own interests dictate that you should not necessarily take the side of the United States against China, because your interest – geopolitics – is a combination of two words: geography and politics. And because the geography of Europe is different from the geography of the United States, it makes sense for Europe to say, “okay, when it comes to our geography, we need to work with China first to create jobs in Africa”. And Europe should not join the United States in blocking Chinese investments in Africa.
  And in some ways Donald Trump should be seen as a gift to Europe. Because Donald Trump says, “My mission is not to make Europe great again. My mission is MAGA –make America great again.” And therefore Europe should say, “Okay, if your mission is to make America great again, our mission is to make Europe great again.” So Europeans should become more pragmatic in the way they handle their geopolitical issues.
  But as Henry Kissinger told me in our last one-on-one conversation, the mental quality of European leaders has diminished a lot. They are no longer able to engage in long-term strategic thinking the way previous generations of leaders could.

Well, the United States was also very successful in building these transatlantic ties and in fostering a lot of European leaders who see more value in continuing those ties and strengthening the U.S. than in strengthening their own domestic capacities, and that is a tragedy. But let us put that aside. Do you think these things will come back into balance in the long or short term? Or do you foresee more turmoil coming, especially for Europe?
You know, there was a famous British statesman – Lord Palmerston, I think his name was – who said that countries do not have permanent friends, they do not have permanent enemies; they only have permanent interests. Now, in the Cold War, it was not values that brought the United States and the European Union together. There was a convergence of interests. Both felt equally threatened by the Soviet Union, and they said, “okay, if you have a common enemy, you cooperate,” right? The Soviet Union was right there on the border of Europe. In fact, Soviet tanks were very close to Germany, so it made sense for Germany to form a close alliance with the United States of America.
  Now, about China – there is a distance between Brussels and Beijing of 12,000 kilometres or more. China is not a threat to Europe. So, in that case, if you want to look after your own interests – as, by the way, to be fair to Donald Trump, he is actually looking after American interests very well, right? He is taking care of American interests – so I think Europe should also learn to take care of its own interests and decide where those interests converge and where they diverge.
  Because in the long run, geopolitical alliances are not based on values; they are based on interests, as Lord Palmerston said. And the European Union needs to do a complete strategic reboot and figure out where its interests lie. Because without doing that reboot, you know, the Europeans are making mistakes. For example, Susan Glasser, a writer for “The New Yorker”, wrote recently that the current European policy is one of practicing “strategic self-abasement.” Those are her words – strategic self-abasement. Now, strategic self-abasement means kowtowing. And you never get anyone’s respect when you kowtow. Therefore, the Europeans will have to work out their own independent foreign policy and not rely on others to safeguard their interests.

May your words, Ambassador, resound in the ears of the Europeans – or the European Union, at least. I have to be very mindful of your time, and I thank you very much for speaking with us. •

Source: https://www.video-translations.org/transcripts/2070_Pascal_2025_11_25_de-DE.pdf
of 26 November 2025 (slightly abridged and linguistically revised version of the transcript of the spoken word)

* Kishore Mahbubani is a Distinguished Fellow at the Asia Research Institute of the National University of Singapore (NUS) and the author of numerous books. He was appointed Founding Dean of the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy (LKY School) at NUS in 2004. From 2004 to 2017, Mahbubani served as dean and from 2006 to 2019 as Professor of Public Policy.

 Pascal Lottaz is an Associate Professor at the Faculty of Law of Kyoto University (Japan). He comes from the Canton of Fribourg and is a member of the Social Democratic Party of Switzerland. Lottaz runs the research network neutralitystudies.com and a YouTube channel of the same name.