EU Framework Agreement: A sham debate looms in the Council of States
by Dr. iur. Marianne Wüthrich
Whilst many of us, for whom the preservation of a neutral and independent Switzerland is a matter close to our hearts, are once again pulling out all the stops on the eve of the referendum on the Neutrality Initiative to engage our fellow citizens in a dialogue about the fundamental importance of Swiss neutrality, the political
establishment and the mainstream media have kept under wraps what is about to hit our country with full force. On 1 September, the news broke in the media: from 28 to 30 September – a mere three days – the Council of States intends to rush the entire Framework Agreement 2.0 with the EU through in one go, with the National Council set to follow suit in its next session. Only the Electricity Agreement is to be postponed until December – though by then its core problem will certainly not have vanished into thin air: namely, the erosion of Switzerland’s high-quality public service and of cantonal and municipal control over the electricity sector, through the privatisation that pervades the EU and the dominance of the energy conglomerates.
Let’s not allow anyone to make us believe that all Members of Parliament have actually read through the dossier – some 2,000 pages long – the numerous texts of the agreements1 and, in particular, the
Institutional Protocol that looms large over the whole thing, let alone considered their implications, before they are expected to rush into saying “yes” to it!
Three days to bring about their disempowerment
The harsh reality is this: Parliament does not actually need much time to debate the framework agreement. This is because it cannot amend the texts of the agreements that the Federal Council has “negotiated” with Brussels. It can only say yes or no to the package as a whole. Here is a small foretaste of what it would face if it were to agree to its own disempowerment through Brussels’ supremacy. Faced with such a grave decision, every Member of Parliament must confront the problem that sovereign Switzerland, with its unique liberal, direct-democratic, neutral and federalist model of state, is incompatible with the EU’s centralised, top-down system.
The three-day sham debate being staged in the Council of States at the end of September is unworthy of our Swiss Parliament. Instead of debating the core issue, activists within the Federal Administration have packaged sham solutions to a few particularly contentious points into federal legislation, and their like-minded colleagues in Parliament are now expected to sell these to us. The preliminary committees dutifully rubber-stamp everything, with only a few dissenting votes.
Particularly disgraceful is the zeal with which several parliamentary committees are allowing themselves to be enlisted as Brussels’ henchmen by organising, for the outside world to see, the monitoring of their own state aid in accordance with a planned federal law bearing the un-Swiss name “Beihilfeüberwachungsgesetz (BHÜG)” (State Aid Monitoring Act): In substance, the EU will impose a ban on state aid on Switzerland through several agreements (land transport, electricity, air transport), thereby dismantling the – still relatively good – public services at federal, cantonal and municipal levels through the all-pervasive privatisation à la Brussels.
The Council of States’ Political Institutions Committee PIC-S on the other hand, does not dare – despite relevant experience with mafia members who have established themselves in the canton of Graubünden – to require new residents to provide a criminal record extract, because the European Commission has criticised this as a breach of the Agreement on the Free Movement of Persons (AFMP). Yet both the National Council and the Council of States have recently called for this in no uncertain terms (Press release of 18 August 2026).
A particular talking point is the so-called “safeguard clause” designed to prevent Switzerland and its attractive social welfare system from being flooded with people wishing to immigrate, particularly as, under the EU Citizens’ Directive, those in employment will in future be allowed to bring over their broadly defined “family members” – including parents-in-law, uncles and cousins in need of care – even from countries outside the EU. Several committees are putting forward proposals for the “effective” application of the safeguard clause (for example, the press release of the Council of States Foreign Affairs Committee FAC-S dated 22 May 2026), knowing full well that the clause in the 1999 Agreement on the Free Movement of Persons (AFMP), which is as similar to the new concept as two peas in a pod, was never once invoked by the Federal Council – despite immigration figures being ten times higher than the Federal Administration had predicted. How likely is it that the Federal Council, which kowtows to the major powers at every turn, will invoke the safeguard clause against Brussels’ will, as it so boldly claims today?
The sword of Damocles: adoption of EU law
All the details that the Federal Council claims it intends to implement in 39 federal laws in a manner compatible with Swiss law could be rendered null and void at any time if the EU amends its legislation. This is because the actual purpose of the Framework Agreement is to oblige Switzerland to adopt current and future EU law. Even the comprehensive dispute settlement procedure, including a so-called arbitration tribunal, cannot change this. The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has the final say, and the right to a referendum – which formally remains in place – is also rendered meaningless by the threat of unknown compensatory measures (i.e. sanctions) from the EU.
A recent example of the paradigm shift from the existing bilateral agreements to the planned framework agreement: Switzerland has so far paid around 300 million Swiss francs a year in unemployment benefits for unemployed cross-border workers from the EU and EFTA regions. The EU has now decided that, instead of the country of residence (for example, France), the country where the person was last employed (i.e. Switzerland) must pay a larger share. For the federal government, this could mean additional costs of between 900 million and 1.2 billion per year. Under the new AFMP, Brussels could oblige Switzerland to pay, but the European Commission takes the view that this already applies under the current AFMP of 1999. The difference is this: today, the disagreement would end up in the Joint Committee, and whether an agreement can be reached there is anyone’s guess. In future, should Switzerland object, the European Commission could demand arbitration proceedings, in which the European Court of Justice would ultimately decide. Take three guesses as to who would be in the right there.
The Economic Affairs and Taxation Committee (EATC-S) is deliberately
taking a stance at odds with the EU treaty package
A single Council of States committee has dared to exercise its legislative powers independently and, on a specific issue relating to wage protection, to take a stand against the wording of the AFMP negotiated with the EU. More important than the subject of this deviation is the committee’s statement in its press release: “The majority of the committee is aware that its proposals on the Posting of Workers Act […] contradict the outcome of the negotiations with the EU and accepts this. The committee must be able to exercise its preliminary deliberation powers […] and critically scrutinise the results of negotiations […] and improve them from its own perspective.”2 The president of the Centre Party, Philipp Matthias Bregy from Valais, sums up the matter: “Some people have only just realised the scale of the agreements and how deeply the dynamic adoption of legislation affects the Swiss legal system,” he is quoted as saying, adding: “That is probably the background to the committee’s decision.”3
This bold decision by the EATC-S has earned it a stern telling-off from other Council of States committees and in the media. Critical members of the public, on the other hand, are expressing their gratitude.
In that case, there’s only one thing to do: say no
In case anyone feels that quoting Wolfgang Borchert’s famous line here is out of place: On 12 March 2026, the National Council very clearly approved a negotiating mandate for an agreement with the EU on security and defence, with 127 votes in favour and 63 against.4 Annoyingly, the Council of States followed suit by a very narrow margin of 21 votes to 20. This decision, of course, violates Swiss neutrality. Given the sabre-rattling from the EU, joining the EU’s military alliance (almost all EU states are also NATO members) could, moreover, well and truly carry the risk of being dragged into a war.
By voting “yes” to the neutrality initiative, we are saying “no” to war. •
1 Free movement of persons, technical barriers to trade, land transport, air transport, agriculture, Swiss contribution, health, food safety, electricity, EU programmes (research, education, etc.)
2Press release from the Council of States’ Economic Affairs and Taxation Committee EATC-S dated 11 August 2026
3 Marti, Simon. “Und schon wackelt der Kompromiss” (And already the compromise is faltering). In: NZZ am Sonntag of 16 August 2026
4 25.3529 Motion by the National Council’s Security Policy Committee SPC-N
A major success for direct democracy – Iceland leads the way
mw. On 29 August 2026, the people of Iceland rejected the resumption of EU accession talks in a referendum, with 52.8 per cent voting against. Voter turnout stood at a high 82.5 percent. With this clear decision, the Icelandic people proved themselves resistant to their own government’s sweet-talking: the fact is that nothing has been decided simply by entering into negotiations; ultimately, the people will have the final say on EU accession. And just as resistant to the EU’s enticements, which promised “exceptions” and “flexibility” on the fisheries dossier in order to bring an attractive net contributor on board.
As a member of the European Economic Area (EEA), Iceland is already largely integrated into the single market; however, full membership to the EU would jeopardise the survival of its domestic fishing and agricultural sectors. For us Swiss, who are about to vote on the framework agreement with the EU, this is yet another warning sign!
But economic reasons were apparently only partly responsible for the ‘no’ vote among Icelanders. According to the “Tages-Anzeiger”, “the fundamental question […] was being asked with increasing frequency: could little Iceland, as a member of an EU with 450 million people, still decide its own fate independently?”
Icelanders often have the opportunity to have their say on important issues in referendums. In 2009, despite a severe financial crisis, they had already voted ‘no’ to EU accession negotiations. At the same time, they collected 60,000 signatures (out of a population of 350,000!) for a referendum against the state treasury taking on the substantial foreign debts of Iceland’s three major banks. For years, the banks had attracted speculators, mainly from the UK and the Netherlands, with high interest rates. Just because they are now facing bankruptcy, should taxpayers be expected to pay back the risky investments made by those who have been profiting for years? No, said Icelandic voters: in March 2010, they overwhelmingly rejected the idea of the state paying off the banks’ debts, with 93 percent voting against it.
Seven years later (2017), the Icelandic economy had already recovered. Werner Wüthrich explained why in Current Concerns at the time: “On the one hand, the voice of the people was crucial to the country’s rescue. Not only did the Icelanders decisively set the course in two national votes. In a variety of ways, the population also played an active part in what was happening – but always without violence. So, for example, by means of witty internet appearances they resisted attempts by Great Britain to denigrate the Icelanders as terrorists and to freeze all Icelandic bank deposits in Great Britain. On the other hand, the Icelanders rolled up their sleeves and knocked back into shape their ailing banking system and their struggling economy. It was also crucial for its rescue that Iceland had its own currency: the massive collapse of the Icelandic crown did not lead to its downfall (as some financial prophets had prophesied), but was a crucial prerequisite for a quick recovery. The Icelandic way out of the banking crisis differs significantly from the European way of bank rescue, debt management and state financing, which the ECB operates today by means of the electronic ‘money printing press’ (by purchasing state papers in large quantities). Obviously, the situation is different in every country, and the Icelandic way cannot be transferred to other countries par for par. However, it shows how a government, together with its population, boldly sought new ways and found a way out of the worst crisis.”
It should be noted that our “government”, the Federal Council, would do well to work just as closely with the people – not on behalf of major powers and warmongers, but for the welfare of our country and our good offices for people all over the world. Following the public’s rejection of EU accession talks in recent days, Iceland’s Prime Minister, Kristrún Frostadóttir, had the grace to say that this was “not a defeat, but a victory for democracy”. A role model for Swiss politicians of all persuasions.
Sources: Wüthrich, Werner. “Iceland in a boom but a-fiasco in Greece”; https://www.zeit-fragen.ch/en/archives/2017/no-14151-july-2017/iceland-in-a-boom-but-a-fiasco-in-greece; Koponen, Linda. “Island lehnt die Beitrittsverhandlungen mit der EU überraschend deutlich ab” (Iceland has rejected accession negotiations with the EU by a surprisingly large margin) Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 30 August 2026; Eigenmann, Dominique. “Island fühlt sich allein noch sicher genug” (Iceland still feels safe enough on its own), Tages-Anzeiger, 30 August 2026