Which post-war order for Europe?

Long before wars come to an end, responsible people start thinking about the post-war order. One well known example is the Atlantic Charter¹ which US President Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Churchill adopted on 14 August 1941 – almost exactly 85 years ago and less than two months after the start of the war of annihilation against the Soviet Union – aboard the British battleship “Prince of Wales”. The phrase stating that the aim was to create a post-war order of peace that would “enable all people in all countries to live their lives free from fear and want” has become famous. There was still no end to the war in sight – quite the contrary. And yet, four years before the war actually ended, the course was set here in a way that went beyond merely “the privileges of the victors”.
    The Atlantic Charter served as an important guide for the Charter of the United Nations adopted in 1945. Obviously, the real world after the end of the Second World War was and is looking different from what was promised at the time. Nevertheless, this Charter and its principles continue to provide a framework of reference for the majority of the world. To put it more accurately: most of the world is striving to realise the principles of the UN Charter, hoping to overcome the current state of war prevailing in many parts of the world, as well as the previous policies of war and power rife with injustice.

Resignation must not take hold

Those who, in the face of increasing violence, military escalation and failed peace efforts, are currently inclined towards resignation should be reminded of this and other historical examples. It is of the utmost importance not to abandon the ideal of peace and to work tirelessly to promote it. No person of reason and compassion can come to terms with the current state of war and the increasingly unscrupulous politics of power. For this reason, too, it is sensible and necessary to begin considering a post-war order now. A post-war order that does not stand for the “victors’ prerogative” – as was the case after the end of the Cold War in 1991 – but rather for a post-war order that once again draws on the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

The CSCE Process

This applies in particular to Europe where since 1991 several wars have raged and are still raging today. For Europe, there is a specific framework of reference to which frequent reference is made: the CSCE process.
    At this point, the tireless efforts of Arne Seifert, former Ambassador at the GDR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, should be highlighted who after 1991 also worked for the OSCE in Central Asia and continues to emphasise to this day how important it would be to take the CSCE process as a guide in overcoming the current state of war in Europe.² Seifert speaks from the experience of the peaceful coexistence of states under the real conditions of the Cold War, during which antagonistically opposed states in the East and West – and their respective social systems – managed to avoid hot wars.
    It is encouraging to note that also in the US there are voices pointing to the great significance of the CSCE process for resolving today’s problems. We want to introduce one such voice here, George Beebe. He is Director of Grand Strategy at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft (QI) and served for more than two decades in government roles as an intelligence analyst, diplomat and political adviser, including as head of the CIA’s Russia analysis unit, as director of the CIA’s Open-Source Centre, and as adviser on Russian affairs to Vice-President Cheney.
    The Quincy Institute – named after US President John Quincy Adams (1767–1848) – is an American think tank that describes itself as follows:
    “The Quincy Institute promotes ideas that move US foreign policy away from endless war, toward military restraint and diplomacy in the pursuit of international peace. […] The practical and moral failures of US efforts to unilaterally shape the destiny of other nations by force requires a fundamental rethinking of US foreign policy assumptions. […] Yet the influence of the ‘military industrial complex’ that President
Eisenhower warned of has led to a situation where the foreign policy debate within Washington is intentionally constrained and fails to incorporate the diversity of views needed for that rethinking.[…] We believe that a foreign policy that emphasizes military restraint and diplomatic engagement and cooperation with other nations will serve American interests and values better than policies that prioritize the maintenance of US global dominance through force.”³

George Beebe

As early as 2018 and again in 2025, George Beebe suggested that US foreign policy issues should be addressed by drawing on concepts from the CSCE process.⁴ In mid-June 2026, he took up the thread once more in a video call with the Norwegian political scientist, author and podcaster Glenn Diesen.⁵
    Beebe makes it clear once again that the war in Ukraine “is not simply a bilateral conflict between Russia and Ukraine”, but “first and foremost a comprehensive geopolitical conflict between Russia and the West”. This conflict has, in essence, existed “since the very first days following the fall of the Berlin Wall”. The issue at stake is “what the framework for European security should look like: […] What role does Russia play in Europe? The West and Russia hold fundamentally different views on this.” Therefore, it is not a matter that can be decided on the Ukrainian battlefield, but rather the “conflict between Russia and the West over European security”. Even a military victory in Ukraine would not resolve Russia’s security problem. “They would be facing a NATO that has effectively doubled its membership since the fall of the Berlin Wall, with significantly more territory, a much longer border with Russia, and a Europe that is rearming and is very, very hostile towards Russia.”

What should we discuss with Russia?

Beebe therefore asks: “So what would be the incentive for the Russians to engage with the West on new ideas? I think the incentive is: let’s talk to the Russians about European security. They have been calling on us to do so for decades – for 30 years – and we have been rather reluctant. They have even put draft treaties on the table and said: ‘Let’s talk.’ And we have said: ‘Well, no thanks.’” Instead, the West has opted for an escalation of the conflict, believing that this will force Russia to back down. “But if you take a step back and recognise that the Russians do see this as a wider geopolitical conflict over Europe and the relationship between the West and Russia, then such an escalation only reinforces Russia’s conviction that this is precisely what is happening. That it is not a bilateral conflict with Ukraine. It is a conflict with the West, which is using Ukraine as a proxy to weaken Russia. This intensifies the sense of an existential threat in Russia.”

Indivisibility of security

This cycle of escalation must be broken. That is why Beebe refers to the CSCE process:
    “Well, what the Russians have been referring to for many, many years is a principle that we first discussed during the Helsinki negotiations, way back during the Cold War. It was enshrined in the HelsinkiFinal Act. It was later explicitly reaffirmed by the Charter of Paris for a New Europe in the early 1990s. It concerns the principle of the indivisibility of security. And that is a simple concept. It essentially recognises the security dilemma referred to in international relations theory: that one side in a relationship may pursue its own security interests in a way that threatens the security of the other side. To reduce the potential for such a security dilemma to trigger a spiral of escalation, one must recognise that the other side also has security concerns. These must be considered if one wishes to strengthen one’s own security. We in the West cannot be secure if Russia is fundamentally insecure, and vice versa.
    It is interesting to note that Russia has repeatedly called for discussions on this principle and for ways to implement it in practice. Back when Dmitry Medvedev was President, during the Obama era, the Russians put forward a treaty. Essentially, it stated that a European security treaty should have this principle of the indivisibility of security as one of its central foundations. And when Putin and the Russian government presented two further draft treaties to the United States and NATO at the end of 2021, prior to the invasion of Ukraine, this principle was also emphasised in what they put on the table. For me, this is now the crux of a diplomatic process. It must be a central focus of the talks between the United States and Russia on our mutual concerns in Europe.”

Territorial integrity or the right to self-determination?

Beebe then addresses the conflict – which is also significant for Ukraine – between the principle of territorial integrity (of Ukraine within its 1991 borders) and the principle of the right to self-determination (of the predominantly Russian-speaking regions in the east of the country):
    “The principle of territorial integrity is at odds with the principle of the self-determination of peoples. So how do we reconcile these tensions? For me, that is precisely what diplomacy is all about. I would therefore say: what are we discussing with the Russians? First and foremost, we should explicitly acknowledge that these tensions between the principles are issues we need to address. And we must find pragmatic compromises between them.
    This is now a completely different approach to the one pursued by the United States. We have essentially said: the principle of territorial integrity is sacrosanct. It must not be violated in any way. It is virtually absolute. The principle that states may choose their own military alliances is absolute. That, too, must not be violated in any way. And the Russians have argued: “Wait a minute. We must also weigh up these principles against the fact that security is indivisible.” Simply acknowledging that and telling the Russians: “We need to discuss how we can reconcile these tensions,” would, in my view, represent a fundamental shift in the US approach. And that alone could go a long way towards moving from what Churchill described as ‘war, war’ to ‘talk, talk’ – in other words, to dialogue. I think that would be far better for everyone involved.”

Europe’s security cannot be NATO-centred

“If we are to discuss more specifically what Europe should look like, then we must also recognise that European security cannot be NATO-centred. NATO cannot be the pan-European security organisation. And there is a very fundamental reason why it cannot be. Russia is not a member. And Russia takes the view that a pan-European NATO fundamentally poses a security threat to Russia, that it violates the principle of the indivisibility of security.”

Rediscovering diplomacy

However, this will not happen overnight: “It will be a long discussion. Such issues cannot be resolved quickly. It will take years. But in my view, starting this discussion and setting out some principles to guide these talks would go a long way towards changing the context in which the war in Ukraine is currently being waged.”
    Glenn Diesen adds: “But we don’t have to start from scratch. As you said: The foundations for how relations between East and West can be shaped were laid by the 1975 Helsinki Final Act. The establishment of the OSCE in 1994 was also based on the principles of indivisible security: how do we avoid dividing lines? One side should not strengthen its security at the expense of others. Sovereign equality.”
    Beebe confirms: “I think that’s right. But I don’t believe we are going back in time. What we are doing is returning to principles. And these principles are, in fact, timeless. International relations were not invented in the last century. Relations between nations and sovereign states go back many, many, many centuries. And as regards the way these nations interact with one another and the principles that apply in doing so: there really is nothing new under the sun. So are we rediscovering diplomacy? Do we need to rediscover diplomacy? Yes, we do. Absolutely. Well, why? Why? Because this liberal hegemony that you described, which we have pursued for most of the post-Cold War era, has failed.”
    In October 2025, in an article entitled “How can peace ethics succeed? The positive example of the CSCE process and Swiss neutrality”⁶, René Roca of the Direct Democracy Research Institute (FIdD) recalled the role played by Swiss diplomacy – committed to strict neutrality – in the success of the CSCE process up to 1975. This year, Switzerland holds the chairmanship of the OSCE, the successor organisation to the CSCE. Switzerland would do Europe (and the world) a great service if it were to take up the baton from across the Atlantic and throw its weight behind reviving the CSCE process. •

¹Die Welt seit 1945. (The world since 1945). Materials for History Lessons, edited by Herbert Krieger, Part 1. Diesterweg, Frankfurt am Main 1983
² See “Peaceful coexistence of states – the imperative of our time”, https://www.zeit-fragen.ch/en/archives/2025/nr-10-29-april-2025/friedliche-koexistenz-der-staaten-gebot-unserer-zeit; “War is the enemy of Europe”, https://www.zeit-fragen.ch/en/archives/2026/no-13-30-june-2026/war-is-the-enemy-of-europe1; “Value conflict and ‘the Cold War of values’”, https://www.zeit-fragen.ch/en/archives/2026/no-15/16-28-july-2026/wertekonflikt-und-kalter-wertekrieg
³https://quincyinst.org/; retrieved 19 August 2026
⁴https://www.russiamatters.org/analysis/helsinki-summit-good-idea-turns-bad of 19 July 2028 and https://nationalinterest.org/feature/to-end-the-ukraine-war-recapture-the-spirit-of-helsinki of 4 September 2025
⁵https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=11G2As-nhO0 of 8 August 2026; transcript: https://www.video-translations.org/transcripts/5763_Diesen_2026_08_08.pdf
⁶https://www.zeit-fragen.ch/en/archives/2025/nr-22-14-oktober-2025-1/nr-23-sonderbeilage-kongress-mut-zur-ethik-1-1/wie-kann-friedensethik-gelingen